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Rulemaking in 140 Characters or 
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Social Networking and Public 
Participation in Rulemaking1 
 
Cynthia R. Farina,* Paul Miller,** Mary J. 
Newhart,*** Claire Cardie,**** Dan Cosley,***** 
Rebecca Vernon,****** and the 
Cornell eRulemaking Initiative2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. For those not among the Twitterati, 140 characters (with spaces) is 
the maximum allowable length of “tweets.” This text has 140 characters. 
  * Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; Principal Investigator, Cornell 
eRulemaking Initiative. 
  ** Marketing and Communications Manager, Legal Information 
Institute; consultant, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative. 
  *** Adjunct Professor, Cornell Law School; Executive Director, Cornell 
eRulemaking Initiative. 
  **** Professor, Department of Computer Science, Cornell University. 
  ***** Assistant Professor, Department of Information Science and 
Department of Communications, Cornell University. 
  ****** Cornell eRulemaking Initiative Fellow in e-Government. 
2. In addition to the authors, the following CeRI researchers and 
affiliates are involved in the project described here: Tom Bruce (Legal 
Information Institute); Austin Eustice (lead designer); Sally Klingel 
(Scheinman Institute for Conflict Resolution); and Eddie Tejeda, (lead 
technology strategist). The complete list of current CeRI researchers and 
students can be found at Who‟s Who, REG. ROOM, 
http://regulationroom.org/whos-who/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) [hereinafter 
Who‟s Who]. 
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Abstract 
 
Rulemaking—the process by which administrative 
agencies make new regulations—has long been a target for e-
government efforts. The process is now one of the most 
important ways the federal government makes public policy. 
Moreover, transparency and participation rights are already 
part of its legal structure. The first generation of federal e-
rulemaking involved putting the conventional process online by 
creating an e-docket of rulemaking materials and allowing 
online submission of public comments. Now the Obama 
administration is urging agencies to embark on the second 
generation of technology-assisted rulemaking, by bringing 
social media into the process.  
In this Article we describe the initial results of a pilot 
Rulemaking 2.0 system, Regulation Room, with particular 
emphasis on its social networking and other Web 2.0 elements. 
Web 2.0 technologies and methods seem well suited to 
overcoming one of the principal barriers to broader, better 
public participation in rulemaking: unawareness that a 
rulemaking of interest is going on. We talk here about the 
successes and obstacles to social-media based outreach in the 
first two rulemakings offered on Regulation Room. Our 
experience confirms the power of viral information spreading 
on the Web, but also warns that outcomes can be shaped by 
circumstances difficult, if not impossible, for the outreach effort 
to control.  
There are two additional substantial barriers to broader, 
better public participation in rulemaking: ignorance of the 
rulemaking process, and the information overload of 
voluminous and complex rulemaking materials. Social media 
are less obviously suited to lowering these barriers. We 
describe here the design elements and human intervention 
strategies being used in Regulation Room, with some success, 
to overcome process ignorance and information overload. 
However, it is important to recognize that the paradigmatic 
Web 2.0 user experience involves behaviors fundamentally at 
odds with the goals of such strategies. One of these is the 
ubiquitousness of voting (through rating, ranking, and 
recommending) as “participation” online. Another is what Web 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
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guru Jacok Neilsen calls the ruthlessness of users in moving 
rapidly through web sites, skimming rather than carefully 
reading content and impatiently seeking something to do 
quickly before they move on. Neither of these behaviors well 
serves those who would participate effectively in rulemaking. 
For this reason, Rulemaking 2.0 systems must be consciously 
engaged in culture creation, a challenging undertaking that 
requires simultaneously using, and fighting, the methods and 
expectations of the Web. 
 
Introduction 
 
Web 2.0 technologies have created extraordinary 
opportunities for forms of social interaction that are 
unprecedented in their nature, scope, and immediacy. Novel 
human behaviors in turn create new challenges for the 
ordering schemes of public and private law. The other papers 
in this Issue join a growing body of commentary that debates 
how to adapt the regimes of tort, contract, intellectual 
property, criminal, and constitutional law to the protean 
environment of the Web and the social networks it supports. 
We share this interest in what happens when a legal system 
that values structure and stability at least as much as 
adaptability engages a medium that enables rapid, 
unpredictable, and large scale change. Our focus, however, is 
somewhat different than the other articles. We are concerned 
with the implications of social media-enabled behaviors for the 
process, rather than the substance, of law—in particular, the 
process of federal agency rulemaking. Of course, process affects 
substance in many subtle, and not so subtle, ways and this is 
certainly true of rulemaking. Still, our primary interest here is 
the interplay of the notice-and-comment process, as 
conventionally structured, and the expectations and dynamics 
of Web 2.0-enabled public participation. 
Rulemaking is the stealth engine of contemporary federal 
policy making. Its impact on individual and collective well-
being is immense.3 Congress passes the statutes that launch 
 
3. See CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
WRITE LAWS AND MAKE POLICY (3d ed. 2003). 
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the federal government into restructuring the provision of 
health care or reforming the financial system, but the working 
content of those programs will be defined by agencies with a 
statutory mandate to write the implementing regulations. 
These recent national policy initiatives have focused public 
attention on the extent to which agencies share in the federal 
lawmaking power, but broad statutory delegations are not 
new.4 More than a century of regulatory legislation—about the 
environment, workplace and consumer safety, energy, 
communications, food and drug standards, transportation, and 
social services—has created a legal regime in which 
administrative policymaking dwarfs that of Congress in 
quantity and rivals it in impact. Agencies pursue their 
regulatory missions through a range of processes, but 
rulemaking is the most significant. 
Rulemaking is a civic paradox. It frequently has 
substantial direct effects on individuals, corporations, state and 
local governments, and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).5 Yet few citizens and groups know about it, and even 
fewer understand how it works. Its formal legal structure is an 
open government ideal, with broader transparency 
 
4. See, e.g., Paul Wiseman & Fredreka Schouten, Financial Regulators 
Face Big Job, USA TODAY, June 28, 2010, at B1, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/regulation/2010-06-25-
implementing-details_N.htm. We use the phrase “federal lawmaking power” 
advisedly. Although formalist constitutional interpretation refuses to 
categorize delegated agency power as “legislative,” see, e.g., Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472-73 (2001), a bedrock administrative 
law principle is that properly promulgated regulations within the scope of the 
agency’s statutory authority have the force of law. Although we acknowledge 
the importance of structural constitutional debates on the point, they seem to 
be the only place that blinks at the reality of agencies as federal lawmakers. 
5. For example, the recent rulemaking by the National Highway 
Transportation Safety Commission on banning texting while driving by 
commercial motor vehicle operators, see Limiting the Use of Wireless 
Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,391 (Apr. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 
49 C.F.R. pts. 383, 384, 390, 391, 392), involves new conduct prohibitions that 
will affect eight million individual truckers, more than 300,000 small 
businesses (the majority of trucking companies affected by the rulemaking), 
and the state and local governments of all fifty states, who are required to 
enforce new texting ban rules in order to keep federal highway money. 75 
Fed. Reg. 16,400 (Apr. 1, 2010). Then of course there are the drivers, 
passengers, pedestrians and bicyclists whose safety would, presumably, be 
improved. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
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requirements and public participation rights than any other 
form of federal decision-making. Yet only a limited range of 
stakeholders take advantage of their right to review the 
information on which an agency is making its decision, and 
effectively exercise their right to comment on the merit of the 
agency’s proposal.6 
This gap between social importance and formal structure 
on the one hand, and civic awareness and actual operation on 
the other, has made rulemaking a prime target for e-
government efforts. Proponents of e-rulemaking have hoped 
that the Internet could make the process more accessible and, 
as a result, more broadly participatory,7 and the E-Government 
Act of 2002 directed rulemaking agencies to move essential 
elements of the process onto the Web.8 The result was the 
creation of a government-wide rulemaking portal, 
Regulations.gov, where users can find rulemaking materials 
and submit their comments.9 This “first generation” of federal 
e-rulemaking essentially put the conventional rulemaking 
 
6. A large literature documents that the notice-and-comment process 
tends to be dominated by a limited range of mostly corporate participants. 
E.g., KERWIN, supra note 3, at 182-84 (collecting literature); Steven J. Balla & 
Benjamin M. Daniels, Information Technology and Public Commenting on 
Agency Regulations, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 46 (2007); Cary Coglianese, 
Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 
943 (2006); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, A Bias Toward 
Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the Bureaucracy, 68 J. POL. 
128 (2006). 
7. E.g., Beth Simone Noveck, The Future of Citizen Participation in the 
Electronic State, 1 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1 (2005). Comprehensive 
discussion of what technology might bring to rulemaking can be found in 
CARY COGLIANESE, E-RULEMAKING: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND 
REGULATORY POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS IN DIGITAL GOVERNMENT RESEARCH 15-
18, 51-58 (2004), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-
rcbg/rpp/erulemaking/papers_reports/E_Rulemaking_Report2004.pdf and 
COMM. ON THE STATUS & FUTURE OF FED. E-RULEMAKING, ACHIEVING THE 
POTENTIAL: THE FUTURE OF FEDERAL E-RULEMAKING 21-22 (2008), available at 
http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/erm-comm.php [hereinafter ACHIEVING THE 
POTENTIAL]. 
8. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 13, 31, 40, 44 U.S.C.). The 
Act required agencies to accept comments “by electronic means” and to make 
available online “public submissions and other materials” included in the 
official rulemaking docket. Id. 
9. The history and development of Regulations.gov are recounted in 
ACHIEVING THE POTENTIAL, supra note 7. 
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process online.10 The materials that agencies previously kept in 
paper form—in dockets in agency records rooms and public 
reading rooms—are now available online in electronic 
rulemaking dockets (e-dockets). The traditional methods of 
submitting comments—delivering a hard copy or sending a 
fax—are now supplemented by online comment submission. 
These have been useful first steps, but they have not 
significantly changed the scope of civic awareness of, or 
engagement in, rulemaking.11 
Enter Web 2.0 and the Obama administration’s 
determination to use social media and other online technologies 
to make government more “transparent,” “participatory,” and 
“collaborative.”12 Agencies were directed to devise “Open 
Government Plans” that include specific proposals for 
innovative uses of technology to inform and engage the public.13 
Not surprisingly, given rulemaking’s centrality to 
contemporary federal government policymaking, there has 
been considerable emphasis on taking the next steps in 
technology-supported rulemaking, a development we call 
“Rulemaking 2.0.” 
What Web 2.0 applications and methods can bring to 
rulemaking is still, to put it mildly, uncertain. Here, we offer 
thoughts on two dimensions of Rulemaking 2.0: 
(1) the use of social networking services and other social 
media to alert and engage stakeholders, and members of the 
general public, who would not otherwise know about 
rulemakings of interest; and 
(2) when such outreach is successful, the opportunities and 
challenges of building online discussion communities able to 
 
10. See JEFFREY LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 
217-39 (4th ed. 2006) (giving details of online system). 
11. See Balla & Daniels, supra note 6; Coglianese, supra note 6. 
12. Memorandum from President Barack Obama on Transparency and 
Open Government to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Jan. 21, 2009), 
available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernme
nt/. 
13. Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, 
on Open Government Directive to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 
8, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda_2010/m10-06.pdf. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
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support effective rulemaking participation. 
We discuss these in a context of early results from a 
specific Rulemaking 2.0 system, Regulation Room.14 This 
project, the core of which is an experimental online public 
participation platform, is a collaboration between the Cornell 
eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI) and the United States 
Department of Transportation (DOT). CeRI is a cross-
disciplinary group of faculty and students at a private research 
university,15 while DOT is one of the largest federal 
rulemaking entities. DOT chose Regulation Room as its 
“flagship initiative” under the Open Government Directive.16 
For its involvement in Regulation Room, DOT received one of 
six Leading Practices awards given by the White House after a 
review of projects across the federal government,17 and, most 
recently, was named one of the 2010 Government Innovators 
by InformationWeek.18 
 
I. Overview of the Regulation Room Project 
 
Regulation Room is a website that uses selected “live” DOT 
rulemakings to experiment with the most effective forms of 
human and computer support for broader, better civic 
engagement in rulemaking.19 DOT is actively involved in 
selecting the rules offered on the site and promoting public use 
of the site, but Regulation Room is not affiliated with the 
 
14. REG. ROOM, http://regulationroom.org/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). 
15. Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative, CORNELL U. , 
http://ceri.law.cornell.edu/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). 
16. Open Government Plan-Chapter 4, DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
http://www.dot.gov/open/plan/op-ch4.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). 
17. The Race to the Top for Openness and Innovation, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
(Aug. 12, 2010, 1:17 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/08/12/race-
top-openness-and-innovation-announcing-agency-open-government-plan-
leading-prac. 
18. John Foley & J. Nicholas Hoover, Government Innovators, 
INFORMATIONWEEK 500 (Sept. 15, 2010), 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/galleries/government/leadership/show
Article.jhtml?articleID=227300277&pgno=5&isPrev=. InformationWeek 500 
identified projects in which “federal, state, and local agencies demonstrate 
that they, too, can apply IT in critical and novel ways.” Id. 
19. About, REG. ROOM, http://regulationroom.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 
3, 2010) [hereinafter About Regulation Room]. 
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federal government.20 The site is conceived and operated by 
CeRI researchers from computing and information science, 
communications, conflict resolution, law, and psychology;21 
CeRI is solely responsible for its substantive content and 
research strategies.22 The team works closely with design and 
programming professionals23 who are interested in the research 
aspects of the project. Regulation Room is hosted by the Legal 
Information Institute (LII),24 which also provides technical 
support and experience in legal informatics.25 To the extent 
possible, we attempt to fund the project through grants26 from 
a variety of sources, including the National Science Foundation 
and Google (although DOT provided partial funding for the 
most recent rulemaking). Details about the origin, operation, 
and technology of the site, and about the nature of the DOT-
CeRI collaboration, are available elsewhere.27 Here we provide 
a brief overview. 
The Regulation Room project proceeds from the premise 
that a successful Rulemaking 2.0 system must attempt to lower 
three substantial barriers to broader, better public 
participation in rulemaking: 
(1)  Ignorance about the rulemaking process; 
(2) Unawareness that rulemakings of interest are going on; 
and 
(3) Information Overload from the length, and linguistic 
 
20. Id. 
21. Who‟s Who, supra note 2. 
22. About Regulation Room, supra note 19. 
23. Who‟s Who, supra note 2. Eddie A. Tejeda is the lead technology 
strategist and developer for Cornell’s e-Rulemaking Initiative project and 
creator of the “digress.it” application discussed below. Id.; About, DIGRESS.IT, 
http://digress.it/about/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). Austin Eustice is the lead 
designer for Cornell’s e-Rulemaking Initiative project. Who‟s Who, supra note 
2. 
24. About Regulation Room, supra note 19. 
25. See About LII, CORNELL U. L. SCH., 
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/lii/about-lii (last visited Nov. 3, 2010). 
26. Thus far, grant support has come from the National Science 
Foundation and the Google Faculty Research Award Program. 
27. See Cynthia R. Farina, Mary J. Newhart, Claire Cardie & Dan 
Cosley, Rulemaking 2.0, Symposium on the Administrative State, 65 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
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and cognitive density, of rulemaking materials.28 
Regulation Room uses a combination of human and 
technology strategies to address each of these barriers. In the 
fall of 2009, the site had a limited public beta test. From March 
to September 2010, two live DOT rulemakings were offered on 
the site: a proposed ban on texting while driving by commercial 
motor vehicle operators (the “texting rule”)29 and a proposed 
extension of airline passenger rights in areas such as bumping, 
tarmac delay, and fee advertising (the “APR rule”).30 Site 
design and functionality, as well as operating protocols, have 
already evolved considerably in the first year of the project.31 
We expect this pattern to continue as we learn how better to 
motivate and support broad-scale online public engagement in 
complex government policymaking, like the drafting of new 
federal regulations. We discuss some of the planned changes 
for Version 4 at various points in this Article. 
To address the barrier of information overload, the website 
presents the major topics of the proposed rule in the form of 
“Issue Posts” on which users can comment. The content of 
these posts is drawn from the agency’s official announcement of 
the rulemaking: the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM). A 
team of Regulation Room students and faculty “translates” the 
relevant NPRM section on each issue into a plain English 
summary of what the agency is proposing to do, and why. The 
result is a set of posts that reduce a twenty to forty page single-
spaced Federal Register document, written at a college or 
graduate school readability level, to a length and complexity 
that most users are able to manage (although whether they are 
 
28. For more extended discussion of why we consider these the principal 
barriers to participation, see id. 
29. Limiting the Use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 
16,391 (Apr. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 383, 384, 390, 391, 392). 
The Regulation Room presentation of the rule can be found at Texting, REG. 
ROOM, http://regulationroom.org/texting/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
30. Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,318 (June 
8, 2010) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234, 244, 250, 253, 259, 399). The 
Regulation Room presentation of the rule can be found at Airline Passenger 
Rights, REG. ROOM, http://regulationroom.org/airline-passenger-rights/ (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2010). 
31. Current protocols include writing issue posts, communications 
outreach, moderation, and summarizing. 
9
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willing to manage the information load is a separate 
question).32 A new application, digress.it, allows targeted 
commenting; that is, users can attach comments to specific 
segments of the Issue Post. Threaded commenting (which 
allows users to reply directly to others’ comments in a visually 
connected stream) facilitates dialogic, rather than merely 
parallel independent, commenting. 
The discussion is actively moderated by students trained 
both in law and in group facilitation techniques, and 
supervised by senior researchers. The moderators police 
inappropriate content and help with site use questions but, far 
more important, they help lower the barriers of both 
information overload and ignorance of the rulemaking process 
by mentoring effective commenting. They point users to 
relevant information, prompt them to provide more details, and 
encourage them to react to different positions. To directly 
address lack of knowledge about rulemaking, the site offers 
educational materials about the process itself and about 
effective commenting, which users can consult on their own 
and to which moderators will sometimes direct them. In the 
most recent rulemaking, moderators responded to one out of 
every four and a half user comments. 
DOT has taken the position that it does not want all the 
online comments, in their raw form, submitted to the 
rulemaking record. Rather, it wants a summary of the 
discussion. Therefore, roughly two weeks before the end of the 
official comment period, the Regulation Room team produces a 
Draft Summary. In a form of crowdsourcing, the Draft is posted 
on the site and registered users are e-mailed an invitation to 
review it and suggest revisions. In both the texting and APR 
rules, this has produced a small but helpful set of comments 
that improved the Final Summary.33 The team reviews the 
suggestions and produces a final Summary of Discussion, 
which is posted on the Regulation Room site and submitted to 
DOT, via Regulations.gov, as an official public comment in the 
 
32. See infra Part III.B. 
33. Draft and Final Summaries, with all summary comments, remain 
available on the site for all rules. See, e.g., Airline Passenger Rights, supra 
note 30. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
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rulemaking. Agencies, we discuss more below,34 are required by 
law to provide an explanation of their reasoning with the rule 
ultimately adopted. Because this explanation must include 
review of and response to comments received, the Summary of 
Discussion should assist rule writers in accurately assessing 
and taking account of the content of large quantities of online 
discussion. A key aspect of the computing and information 
science research in the project is finding ways for technology to 
support summarizing hundreds, or thousands, of online 
comments. 
To lower the barrier of unawareness, a major component of 
the project (not directly visible on the website) is an outreach 
campaign tailored to each rulemaking. Section B describes the 
combination of conventional and social media strategies used in 
the texting and APR rulemakings to alert members of 
stakeholder groups and invite them to participate through 
Regulation Room. Based on this early experience, we discuss 
the potential and the challenges of using technology-enabled 
social networking to alert and engage stakeholders unlikely to 
participate in the conventional process. There is cause to be 
optimistic about the potential: in the two rulemakings offered 
so far, well over 90% of registered users report never having 
commented in a federal rulemaking before.35 Hence, it is 
possible for Rulemaking 2.0 systems to bring new stakeholders 
into the process. However, we have also discovered significant 
obstacles that will require different strategies to overcome. 
Section II.C then turns to what happens when outreach is 
successful. We discuss some of the opportunities and 
difficulties of using Web 2.0 to lower the barriers of ignorance 
and information overload when people with no previous 
experience of federal rulemaking engage the process for the 
first time online. The Web 2.0 environment opens up 
dramatically new possibilities for stakeholder participation, 
but it also comes with a set of habits and expectations that do 
not serve users well when the goal is informed and thoughtful 
 
 34.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
35. Only 2% of registered users in the texting rule reported having 
submitted a comment in a federal rulemaking before; the comparable figure 
in the APR rule was 6%. Response rate on this voluntary survey was 100% in 
the texting rule and 92% in the APR rule. 
11
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engagement in complex policy issues. 
 
II.  The “Outreach Mix”: Using Web 2.0 to Promote 
Rulemaking Participation 
 
A.   From Billboard to Discussion Board to My Board 
 
Advances in Web technology have simultaneously enabled, 
and been driven by, the emergence of the Internet as a prime 
venue for social and political engagement. Initially, the Web 
gained popularity as a place where organizations could place 
information for easy retrieval by large numbers of 
geographically dispersed users. These early efforts were 
effectively electronic billboards, largely one-way 
communication with content provided and controlled by the site 
operator. It did not take long for groups and individual users to 
recognize that the Web’s immediacy could make possible two-
way conversations occurring in (or near) real-time. Threaded 
discussion boards emerged, where users could respond to one 
another via text postings usually organized around a common 
theme. These boards quickly developed into early online 
communities in which lovers of old movies or owners of Ford 
Mustangs could exchange information and share ideas. 
Organizations like Greenpeace and the Red Cross soon 
recognized the potential of online community building for 
soliciting donations and mobilizing members. 
Soon, Web users wanted the next step: rather than having 
to rely on others to create a site that pushed information or 
allowed discussion about topics that interested or concerned 
them, users wanted to be able to create their own sites. The 
(relatively) primitive two-way interactions of the early 
discussion boards gave way to a model in which each user could 
have a discussion board of his or her own. The first wave of this 
technology took the style of a private journal, albeit one on 
which others could post comments. These “Web logs” (soon 
shortened to “blogs”) were the earliest instantiation of what 
has become a distinctively Web 2.0 phenomenon: technology 
that enables fully self-determined individual expression, with 
the world as audience. The desire of users for both publishing 
autonomy and community interactivity led to the creation of 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
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social networking services such as MySpace and Facebook, 
media sharing sites such as Flickr (photos) and YouTube 
(videos), and collaborative work applications such as 
MediaWiki (the software of Wikipedia) and Google Docs 
(originally Writely). Success fueled user demands for more and 
easier functionality, leading services like Facebook and 
WordPress (blogware), which initially had offered a particular, 
relatively specific set of functionalities, to evolve into stand-
alone multimedia web publishing platforms. 
The development of Web 2.0 technologies, and the rapidly 
growing number of “ordinary” people willing to use them, 
created opportunities for mass social and political engagement 
that were qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, novel. 
Howard Dean’s presidential campaign in 2003 was one of the 
first major efforts to exploit these opportunities on a national 
scale. Non-profit groups had been using some of the same 
techniques (e.g., multimedia websites, blogs) to share content 
and rally support, but the Dean campaign took these efforts to 
a new level of grassroots organizing. The campaign used blog 
messaging for online community building, while “meet-ups” 
helped extend virtual community to the world outside the Web. 
In a well-organized attempt to bring citizen campaigning to the 
Internet, the campaign encouraged users to send links and e-
mail messages to their friends in order to build the community 
of Dean supporters.36 
The Dean campaign presaged a new approach to engaging 
the public’s attention and engagement. Over the course of the 
last decade, organizational communications strategy has 
increasingly become less about pushing the message to people, 
and more about connecting people to the message via their own 
friends and followers. The sheer number of users and volume of 
activity in today’s online social networks means that organizers 
must now deliberately make use of these networks if they are 
 
36. For accounts of the Dean campaign’s use of the Web, see, for 
example, Andrew Chadwick, Web 2.0: New Challenges for the Study of E-
Democracy in an Era of Informational Exuberance, 5 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y 9 (2008-09); Grant Gross, Election 2004: Howard Dean Profits from 
Web Campaign, CIO ONLINE (Jan. 15, 2004), 
http://www.cio.com/article/32064/Election_2004_Howard_Dean_Profits_from_
Web_Campaign. 
13
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to follow the age-old advertising maxim of “going where the 
audience is.”37 
The unprecedented opportunities presented by online 
social networking come, however, with some potentially 
unpleasant strings attached. It is no longer enough for the 
organization to focus on building a better website (although 
this is still important in a world of dramatically rising user 
expectations about design and functionality). Today’s users are 
living in large online communities like Facebook and Twitter 
that are immediate, expansive, individually defined and 
customized, and largely self-policed. They are not easily led 
away to interact on an organization’s site—unless, that is, one 
of their friends has already done so and promoted his or her 
action within a larger community space like a Facebook wall. 
Organizations therefore must adapt, from the model of a single 
voice broadcasting a message via multiple media, to a model in 
which information spreads “virally” from user to user. The 
downside, from a “marketing” point of view, is that the 
organization quickly loses control of the message as users 
redistribute it. The promise of free access to a potential 
audience of millions thus comes with the threat of countless 
users who can attack or pervert the message as easily as share 
and recommend it. As a result, organizations are forced to 
become not just proactive communicators but reactive ones as 
well, as the fortuity of circumstance and the capriciousness of 
word-of-mouth are magnified by the immediacy and reach of 
the Web. 
In this environment, how does Rulemaking 2.0 promote 
 
37. Statistics abound on the explosion of online social networking in all 
demographic categories. Here is one we find especially compelling: according 
to a recent ComScore study, in August 2010 Facebook’s more than 500 
million active users spent 41.1 million minutes on the site, which represented 
nearly 10% of the total time they spent online. Alison Diana, Facebook 
Overtakes Google As Top Online Destination, INFO. WK. (Sept. 10, 2010), 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/smb/ebusiness/showArticle.jhtml?arti
cleID=227400139. This number exceeds time spent on all Google sites 
(including YouTube, Gmail, Google Books, and Google Maps). Facebook had 
surpassed time on Yahoo sites the previous month. Id. For additional 
statistics on the makeup of Facebook users, see Jennifer Van Grove, 
Facebook‟s 500 Million Members, MASHABLE, 
http://mashable.com/2010/07/22/facebook-500-million-infographic/ (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
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rulemaking engagement with audiences who have a stake in a 
proposed rule but do not know it? Certainly a central part of 
the strategy must be relying on individual user and organized 
groups to help spread the message and call to action in a viral 
way. Still, even in a Web 2.0 world, communications strategists 
rely on “outreach mix”: the balance of media, message, and 
vehicle that offers maximum return on promotional 
investment. Our early experience with Regulation Room 
confirms that traditional media resources and promotional 
tactics will continue to play an important role in getting the 
right message to the right audiences. Successful outreach 
means identifying targeted audience segments and developing 
a mix of Web 2.0 and conventional media to reach these 
segments—with the mix, as well as the segments, varying with 
the particular rule. The strategy must provide for both 
proactive push and reactive response and, perhaps most 
important, it must be able to adapt to a broad range of events 
and circumstances that even the most foresighted planning will 
be unable to anticipate or control. 
 
B.   The Texting Rule: “Scooped” 
 
The outreach plan for the DOT rulemaking proposing to 
ban texting while driving by commercial motor vehicle (CMV) 
operators identified more than one hundred groups that might 
have an interest in the proposed rule. We categorized these 
groups into six audience segments for targeted messaging: 
Safety Interest (motor vehicle accident victims’ rights groups; 
parenting groups; general safety advocate groups; medical 
groups; cycling/pedestrian/motorbike organizations); Driver 
Interest (school bus directors/drivers; limousine drivers; truck 
driver associations; auto driver associations); Business Interest 
(small business associations; auto and truck manufacturer 
associations; wireless device industry companies; insurance 
companies); Public Servant Interest (local and state law 
enforcement; local and state government officials); Open 
Government Interest (open government advocates; government 
publications; selected Hill staff and elected officials); and 
Academic Interest (administrative law professors; research 
groups; law librarians). We sought out these latter two groups 
15
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in the hope that they would be interested enough in a 
Rulemaking 2.0 project to publicize it, and to provide feedback 
on the materials and methods we were using to engage the 
public. 
Our outreach mix included traditional media, targeted 
outreach to constituent groups concerned with the rule’s core 
issues, proactive messaging to issue-specific groups on social 
networks, and reactive responses to social network users who 
posted personal status updates about the issues. 
 
1. Traditional Methods 
 
Coinciding with DOT’s press release on the rulemaking,38 
we delivered a separate press release to seventy-three 
identified media contacts covering transportation, technology, 
government, business, and the law. Outlets included national 
media (New York Times, Washington Post, AP), as well as local 
media and industry publications. A search using Meltwater 
News39 showed over 550 articles on the rulemaking after its 
opening on March 31. Both DOT’s press release and its Notice 
of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) (which formally announces 
the proposal and requests public comments) specifically pointed 
commenters to Regulation Room.40 Nonetheless, only some of 
these articles mentioned that people could go to the site to 
learn more and comment. 
Each of the one hundred constituent groups received an e-
mail twenty-four hours after the rule opened, and a follow-up 
phone call ten days later. Some groups were not interested in 
the rulemaking or did not wish to help promote it to their 
members. Others reported promoting it via e-mail, newsletter, 
 
38. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., U.S. Transportation Secretary 
Ray LaHood Proposes Rule to Ban Texting for Truck and Bus Drivers (Mar. 
31, 2010), available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/2010/dot5510.htm. 
39. Meltwater News is a professional-grade enterprise level news 
tracking service. Meltwater News, MELTWATER GROUP, 
http://www.meltwater.com/products/meltwater-news/ (last visited Nov. 5, 
2010). In addition to search and archiving, it offers a variety of metrics, such 
as geographical distribution. Id. 
40. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., supra note 38; Enhancing 
Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,318 (June 8, 2010) (to be 
codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234, 244, 250, 253, 259, 399). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
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or social networking, although we had little success obtaining 
independent verification of this, and our experience in the APR 
rule (described below) makes us at least skeptical that 
organizations actively spread the word to their members. The 
total potential audience from these groups was estimated to be 
well over 250,000 individuals; groups who said they shared our 
message had an audience of roughly 90,000 people. One group 
in particular, the League of American Bicyclists, did promote 
Regulation Room via social networking and an e-mail 
notification to their members. This caused a slight spike in 
user visits to the site, accompanied by some comments on the 
danger to cyclists from distracted drivers.41 
 
2. Social Networking 
 
We identified Facebook Groups and Pages affiliated with 
the various constituent groups. We also tried to locate groups 
whose online existence occurred solely within the Facebook site 
(that is, they had no independent website or other web 
presence that we could discover). We made similar efforts with 
Twitter. When the rule opened, we asked the owners of the 
group to post the message about the rulemaking and 
Regulation Room. Where permitted by the group’s privacy 
setting, we also posted directly on their wall. Unfortunately, 
this was considered spamming by Facebook and the posting 
persona we had used was shut down (the obstacles this 
presents to social networking outreach became more evident in 
the APR rule, and are discussed below). To organizations on 
Twitter, we delivered an invitation to participate via direct 
messaging their Twitter account. Some ignored the message 
while others reposted or re-tweeted it. We estimate the total 
number of followers exposed to this initial tweet at nearly 
35,000. We also encouraged people to “friend” the Regulation 
Room Facebook page or follow us on Twitter to receive updated 
information as the rulemaking period progressed.42 These fans 
 
41. An unanticipated consequence of our outreach to this group seems to 
have been a large number of cyclist comments posted on the official 
government rulemaking portal, Regulations.gov.  
42. At the end of the period, however, we had only nineteen Facebook 
17
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and followers received messages each day that focused on 
specific issues in the rulemaking and asked them to visit or 
revisit Regulation Room to comment. 
In addition to these proactive efforts, we engaged in 
reactive posting. Using the social media monitoring tool Social 
Mention,43 we continually watched social networks for phrases 
such as “distracted driving” or “texting and driving” and 
uncovered nearly one hundred blogs about the rulemaking. We 
visited the blogs and, where it was possible to post a comment, 
left an invitation to participate through Regulation Room. The 
HootSuite44 software makes possible similar reactive posting on 
Twitter. For example, if someone tweeted “Saw someone 
texting and driving today . . . idiot!” we would reply to that 
tweet with an invitation to have her comment on distracted 
driving at Regulation Room. Reactive posting is far more 
difficult to use with Facebook, for most individual posts are 
available only to people the individual has “friended.” 
 
3. Outcomes 
 
The texting rule was open for thirty-four days—an 
atypically short comment period. In that time, 1,999 “unique 
visitors”45 made 3,729 visits to the site; fifty-four of these 
 
fans and seventy-five Twitter followers. 
43. Social Mention tracks search strings in real time “across the 
universe” of user-generated content (blogs, comments, bookmarks, etc.). See 
About, SOCIALMENTION, http://www.socialmention.com/about/ (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2010). 
44. HOOTSUITE, http://hootsuite.com/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
45. Google Analytics, which measured the data reported in the text, 
explains:    
Visits represent the number of individual sessions initiated 
by all the visitors to your site. If a user is inactive on your 
site for 30 minutes or more, any future activity will be 
attributed to a new session. Users that leave your site and 
return within 30 minutes will be counted as part of the 
original session. 
 The initial session by a user during any given date 
range is considered to be an additional visit and an 
additional visitor. Any future sessions from the same user 
during the selected time period are counted as additional 
visits, but not as additional visitors. 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
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registered as users and eighteen submitted a total of thirty-two 
comments. 94% of registered users reported that they had 
never before submitted a comment in a federal rulemaking and 
another 4% answered that they were unsure if they had ever 
done so. 
We felt the results were disappointing (although it is 
difficult to identify comparables by which to gauge the success 
of efforts to alert and engage people to visit a new kind of 
website in order to participate in a completely unfamiliar 
government decision-making process). On the one hand, almost 
all of those who registered had not previously participated in 
the rulemaking process. On the other, the volume of response 
was far less than we, and DOT, had expected. The unusually 
short comment period may have played some part in the low 
turnout (compare with the airline passenger rights rule, open 
for 110 days, discussed in the next section), but we believe the 
major factor was an event outside our control which 
significantly altered the media and social networking 
environment in which we were trying to push our message—
and which carries an important lesson for Regulation Room 
and other Rulemaking 2.0 efforts. 
On January 26, just over two months before the texting 
rule opened for comment, Secretary of Transportation Ray 
LaHood held a live press conference with the President of the 
American Trucking Association on the dais and representatives 
of the major media and trade associations present.46 LaHood 
 
 
What's the Difference Between Clicks, Visits, Visitors, Pageviews, and Unique 
Pageviews?, GOOGLE ANALYTICS, 
http://www.google.com/support/analytics/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=5716
4 (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). A further complication not mentioned here is 
that “visits” and “visitors” are recognized by IP address. An IP (Internet 
Protocol) address is a number assigned to each computer’s network interface, 
in order to distinguish one network interface from another, see IP Address, 
WIKTIONARY, http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/IP_address (last modified Sept. 12, 
2010). So, recording “visitors” is actually recording a computer or other 
networked device’s “address.” This means that repeat visitors could be the 
same individual returning to the site or a different family member on a home 
computer, or a different patron using a public computer at, e.g., a library. 
Similarly, a new visitor could be the same individual using a different 
computer. 
46. See Press Conference, Ray LaHood, Secretary of Transportation, U.S. 
19
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announced that, beginning immediately, DOT was banning 
texting while driving for commercial motor vehicle drivers. The 
legal explanation for this surprising development will make 
sense to administrative law mavens: DOT was issuing 
“guidance” that interpreted an existing, more general trucking 
safety regulation to encompass texting, and guidance generally 
requires no process beyond publishing it in the Federal 
Register. The larger socio-political explanation is not hard to 
reconstruct. During late 2009 and early 2010, the level of 
public and media attention to distracted driving was high. In 
September, Secretary LaHood launched a highly publicized and 
well-attended Distracted Driving Summit, at which he 
promised that DOT would take prompt action.47 Shortly 
thereafter, the President issued an executive order prohibiting 
federal employees from texting while driving.48 In January, 
Oprah Winfrey dedicated an episode of her show to texting,49 
“America’s New Deadly Obsession,” that became the core of an 
aggressively promoted campaign by Oprah to raise public 
awareness of the issue. The texting rule moved through DOT 
on an expedited schedule but, even so, the process extended 
until the early fall of 2010.50 The new “interpretation,” 
announced by the Secretary at the January 26 press 
conference, was a stop gap measure that responded to public 
pressure while the rulemaking could be completed. 
The consequences for rulemaking participation were, 
however, dramatic. The texting NPRM raised some difficult 
issues—including the definition of the activities prohibited51 
 
Dep’t of Transp., Remarks at Motor Carriers Distracted Driving Press Event 
(Jan. 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/2010/lahood01262010.htm. 
47. Press Release, Ray LaHood, Sec’y of Transp., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 
Kicks Off Historic Summit to Tackle Dangers of Distracted Driving (Sept. 30, 
2009), available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/2009/dot15509.htm. 
48. Exec. Order No. 13,513, 74 Fed. Reg. 51,225 (Oct. 6, 2009). 
49. Oprah‟s No Phone Zone, OPRAH.COM, 
http://www.oprah.com/packages/no-phone-zone.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2010). 
50. Limiting the Use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 
59,118 (Sept. 27, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 383, 384, 390, 391, 
392). 
51. Although everyone referred to it as banning texting, the proposed 
rule was actually entitled “Limiting the Use of Wireless Communications 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
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and the practicality and methods of enforcement—that would 
not only directly affect the eight million drivers who could be 
disqualified from CMV driving for a violation,52 but also would 
almost certainly have implications for other planned DOT 
distracted driving regulations. But for a public who barely 
knows that the rulemaking process exists (let alone appreciates 
the difference between a non-binding general interpretation 
and a detailed regulation backed up by fines and more serious 
sanctions), the moment for debating whether and how the 
federal government should regulate texting by truck and bus 
drivers had come, and gone, long before the comment period 
opened. In the first seven days after the Secretary’s January 26 
press conference, more than 1,500 online news outlets and 
blogs picked up the texting ban story. A count by the 
Regulation Room team found more than 430 individual 
 
Devices,” and the definition of texting, at least potentially, covers a lot more 
than texting: 
 
Texting means manually entering alphanumeric text into, 
or reading text from, an electronic device. 
(1) This action includes, but is not limited to, short message 
service, e-mailing, instant messaging, a command or request 
to access a World Wide Web page, or engaging in any other 
form of electronic text retrieval or electronic text entry, for 
present or future communication. 
(2) Texting does not include: 
 (i) Reading, selecting, or entering a telephone number, 
an extension number, or voicemail retrieval codes and 
commands into an electronic device for the purpose of 
initiating or receiving a phone call or using voice commands 
to initiate or receive a telephone call; 
 (ii)  Using an in-cab fleet management system or 
citizens band radio; 
 (iii)  Inputting or selecting information on a global 
positioning system or navigation system; or 
 (iv)  Using a device capable of performing multiple 
functions for a purpose that is not otherwise prohibited in 
this rule. 
 
Limiting the Use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,391, 
16,403 (Apr. 1, 2010). 
52. First time violation would trigger only a fine (although a sizable one, 
especially for independent owner operators); multiple violations with a 
specified time period would result in a sixty to 120 day disqualification to 
operate a CMV. See id. 
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comments on these various sites; forty-one comments were 
made on the Secretary’s own blog, “FastLane.”53 By contrast, 
two months later, when the texting rule was published for 
comment, only about one-third as many online news stories 
and blog posts mentioned the rulemaking. The difference in 
comments by individual users was even more dramatic: not 
even 10% as many comments (34) on these various articles, and 
only nine comments on the FastLane blog.54 Banning texting by 
CMV drivers had become old, and uncontroversial, news. 
In the end, the texting rule told us more about what can 
stymie outreach than about what communications strategies 
are most effective. Neither traditional media nor social 
networking efforts could give life to an issue on which the news 
cycle had already run and public interest faded. Perhaps, with 
a longer comment period, we could have elicited some 
additional participation from within the large population of 
CMV operators, although we have since realized that 
convincing representative organizations to act as channels of 
information for their members is extremely difficult (see 
below). The most important lesson we took away from the 
texting rule is the importance of an outreach plan that is 
attuned and, to the extent possible, responsive, to external 
circumstances, including the level of traditional media coverage 
of the rule. This lesson proved important in our next rule, the 
airline passenger rights rulemaking. 
 
C.   The Airline Passenger Rights Rule: The Power of User-To-
User Communication 
 
The ARP rule was actually DOT’s second round of 
rulemaking in the area: new regulations on tarmac delay and 
 
53. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., New Distracted Driving Restrictions on 
Commercial Truck and Bus Drivers, FASTLANE (Jan. 26, 2010, 9:32 AM), 
http://fastlane.dot.gov/2010/01/commercial-truck-and-bus-drivers-prohibited-
from-texting-while-driving.html. 
54. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Proposed Texting Ban for Commercial Truck 
and Bus Drivers Pioneers Innovative e-Rulemaking Partnership, FASTLANE 
(Mar. 31, 2010, 9:06 AM), http://fastlane.dot.gov/2010/03/proposed-texting-
ban-for-commercial-truck-and-bus-drivers-pioneers-innovative-erulemaking-
partnershi.html. 
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other high-profile air travel issues took effect in April 2010.55 
Although this event generated a fair amount of media 
attention, the issues of overbooking and bumping, flight status 
information, separate baggage and other fees, and even tarmac 
delay, continued to plague air travelers. Therefore, both our 
team and DOT anticipated substantial public interest in the 
follow-up rulemaking. The comment period was initially 
scheduled for sixty days, which would allow more opportunity 
for viral spread of information among stakeholders. At the 
same time, we were concerned about whether interest could be 
sustained over this period, a concern that was heightened once 
it became clear that DOT would likely grant an extension of the 
comment period if asked. (Airlines did ask, and the official 
comment period ultimately stretched to 113 days,56 practically 
forever in Web-time). We therefore planned to meter our 
outreach efforts, in order to keep the communications stream 
flowing throughout most of the comment period. 
 
1. Traditional Media 
 
In the APR rulemaking, Secretary LaHood’s charismatic 
media presence dramatically kicked off Regulation Room 
outreach efforts. A conference call with more than seventy 
transportation writers, representing major media outlets, 
marked the announcement of the rule’s opening. During the 
call, Secretary LaHood made several significant mentions of 
Regulation Room and urged air travelers to go to the site to 
comment. Within twenty-four hours, Google News captured 
more than six hundred stories that mentioned the 
rulemaking—nearly twice as many as had occurred during the 
entire comment period of the texting rule.57 In the first week, 
 
55. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., New DOT Consumer Rule 
Limits Airline Tarmac Delays, Provides Other Passenger Protections (Dec. 
21, 2009), available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/2009/dot19909.htm. The 
rule itself can be found at Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 68,983 (Dec. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 234, 253, 259, 399). 
56. See Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 45,562 
(Aug. 3, 2010). 
57. We used GoogleNews rather than Meltwater, see supra note 39 and 
accompanying text, for this purpose because it was easier to share search 
23
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3,482 visitors made 4,204 visits to the site from 174 different 
sources—1.75 times as many visitors as had come during the 
entire texting rule. 
Despite the Secretary’s strong endorsement in the news 
conference, fewer than twenty of the hundreds of news articles 
in the first week actually mentioned Regulation Room. 
Therefore, members of the team visited each of these online 
stories, and where possible, posted a message in the article’s 
comment section promoting Regulation Room as a participation 
resource.58 We can find little direct evidence that this reactive 
posting was effective. Visits originating at online news sites 
came from those that posted articles mentioning Regulation 
Room in the text. 
As in the texting rule, we had previously identified 
stakeholder groups that were less likely to hear about the 
rulemaking through conventional channels. These fell into six 
categories: sellers of air travel (travel agents, online travel 
merchants); travel information sites and travel bloggers (e.g., 
tripadvisor.com, lonelyplanet.com); pilots and flight attendants; 
air traffic controllers and regional airport management; airport 
ground personnel (mechanics, baggage and food service crews, 
and gate agents); and travelers. Given the large amount of 
traffic generated by the initial media response, we decided to 
wait to reach out proactively to these groups. Although traffic 
dropped (expectably) from the first week peak, June 2-9, a 
fairly steady stream of new visitors continued to view the 
website through June and the first half of July, with occasional 
peaks from follow-up news stories on CNN and in the 
Washington Post. In late July, when it became clear that an 
extension of the comment period was likely, we looked at the 
results of the survey in which we asked registered users to 
identify their interest in the rulemaking. The overwhelming 
 
results across the outreach team. 
58. The lines between “traditional media” and “social media” blur in the 
case of online news articles. Mainstream news sites now often offer blog-like 
participation from readers by allowing comment on some or all of their online 
stories. These sites can be differentiated from pure blogs because they have 
an editorial staff that determines what is covered and in what form, and 
usually a traditional component of print, television or radio. Thus, most offer 
a mix of one-way and two-way stories. Where two-way stories were posted, 
we left comments promoting Regulation Room. 
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number of respondents identified themselves as airline 
travelers; only a handful self-identified as working in the air 
travel industry. These results were consistent with what the 
moderators observed in the comments. Because we believed 
that those employed in the industry would likely have a 
different perspective than either air travelers or the airlines 
themselves (who would doubtless file comments directly on 
Regulations.gov), we targeted four audience segments for 
proactive outreach: pilots, flight attendants, air workers (air 
traffic controllers), and ground workers (mechanics, baggage 
handlers, airport workers, and security personnel). E-mails 
were sent to twelve groups, whose total membership 
approached five million individuals. We made follow-up phone 
calls to the groups ten days later. 
The follow-up calls were illuminating—and sobering. 
Several groups, including four unions and professional 
associations, told us that an organizational decision had been 
made not to submit comments in this rulemaking.59 They 
acknowledged their members’ right to comment individually in 
the rulemaking via Regulation Room, but were unwilling to 
pass along a message that might be seen as encouraging them 
to do so. 
 
2.  Social Media 
 
Beginning with the Secretary’s announcement on June 2, 
we posted messages about the rulemaking on the Regulation 
Room Facebook wall and to our Twitter stream. Given our 
experience with perceived spamming in the texting rule, we 
decided that we could not engage in proactive posting on 
Facebook walls of constituent groups. On Twitter, we posted 
reactively to a few feeds that had mentioned the rule by name, 
hoping that these seemingly well-attuned individuals would re-
tweet or further promote the site. We could find no evidence 
that they did so. 
 
59. Taking a public position in the rulemaking posed a dilemma—anger 
their employers with pro-regulation comments or anger their customers with 
anti-regulation comments—which air travel worker groups avoided by saying 
nothing. 
25
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In late July, when it became evident that targeted 
outreach to workers in the air travel industry was necessary, 
we sent e-mail messages to eleven constituent groups who have 
a social media viewership of about forty-eight thousand. We did 
not receive any response from the site owners, nor did we see 
any sign of our announcement being promoted further via 
social media. Based on this poor response, and in light of the 
substantial response generated by traditional media, we cut 
back our proactive social networking to concentrate resources 
on personal outreach to these groups and traditional media 
outlets. However, we did continue to post regular messages on 
Regulation Room’s Facebook page and Twitter account, weekly 
at first, and then daily in the early weeks of the targeted 
outreach to air travel industry workers. 
In general, reactive tweeting was not a particularly 
effective form of outreach for this rule. To our surprise (and 
more than a little ironically), there had been much more 
Twitter traffic about texting and other forms of distracted 
driving than there appeared to be about problems people 
encountered in air travel. This, combined with the moderating 
demands on our smaller summer staff, led us to engage in only 
sporadic reactive tweeting efforts. In the last weeks of the 
comment period, we increased proactive tweeting, focusing on 
each major issue in the rulemaking in turn and trying to add a 
sense of urgency to the tweets as the discussion period closed. 
In general, proactive tweeting was only mildly successful.60 
 
 3.  Outcomes 
 
During the 110 days the rule was open on Regulation 
Room,61 a total of 19,320 unique visitors made 24,441 visits; of 
these, 1,189 registered as users. Three hundred forty-eight 
users actually participated in the discussion, posting a total of 
 
60. From June 2, 2010 to September 20, 2010, we had only thirty-one 
clicks on Tweets that we posted, fifteen of them in the first week the rule 
opened. 
61. Regulation Room closed three days before the official comment 
period ended to allow for completion of the Final Summary and submission to 
Regulations.gov. 
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931 comments.62 Here is a global breakdown of how these 
visitors came to the site:63 
 
 One-third of the visits came “directly,” which means not 
from someplace else on the Web. People who type 
Regulationroom.org into their browser or who come from links 
in an e-mail message are “direct traffic.” As we detail below, a 
considerable subset of direct traffic appears to have come from 
the print versions of news articles in the Washington Post 
Travel Section and other newspapers. Direct visitors tended to 
be more engaged than the typical visitor to the site: they 
averaged considerably more time per visit on the site (4:11 
 
62. Moderators made 203 comments. 
63. The source of traffic, the average time spent on the website, the 
average number of pages subsequently visited, and the average time spent on 
each page was gathered by Google Analytics. These are considered first-level 
web metrics and are not suitable for statistical analysis for a number of 
reasons, including how the data is collected and presented. For example, 
average time on a page is calculated by subtracting the initial view time for a 
particular page from the initial view time for a subsequent page. Therefore, 
the time spent on a page cannot be calculated if someone enters and exits on 
the same page. For an explanation of all the pertinent terminology, see 
Metrics Definitions, GOOGLE ANALYTICS, 
https://www.google.com/support/googleanalytics/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answe
r=99118 (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). Also, statistical analysis requires the 
complete set of information that is known; the first-level metrics lack the 
data on variance that are required for that type of assessment. Analysis of 
advanced web metrics will be a focus of future project efforts. For an overview 
into the basic tenets of advanced web analytics techniques, see BRIAN 
CLIFTON, ADVANCED WEB METRICS WITH GOOGLE ANALYTICS (2d ed. 2010). 
52%
33%
15%
Traffic Sources: APR Rule
Referring Sites Direct Traffic Search Engines
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minutes versus 3:17 minutes for all users) and looked at 
considerably more material (3.36 pages per visit versus 2.77 
pages per visit for all users). Slightly over 15% of traffic came 
from people who found the site by using a search engine. 
Visitors who came via a search engine tended to be slightly less 
engaged than the typical visitor: they averaged 2:54 minutes 
per visit (versus 3:17 minutes for all users) and looked at 2.44 
pages (versus 2.77 pages for all users). Finally, more than half 
of visits originated from some other website. The top three 
referring sites were CNN, Facebook, and Frommers, which 
together accounted for about 23% of all traffic.64 Overall, 
visitors who were referred by another site also tended to be 
slightly less engaged, averaging 2.50 minutes per visit (versus 
3.17 minutes for all users) and looking at 2.49 (versus 2.77 
pages for all users). However, visitors who came from the top 
three referring sites averaged only 2.05 minutes and 1.92 pages 
per visit. 
 
 
 After the first week, most spikes in site traffic are 
associated with stories by conventional news media; some of 
these stories appeared only online (e.g., a June 22 , 2010 report 
published on CNN’s website65); others appeared both in print 
 
64. The Department of Transportation’s website was recorded as the 
fourth most active referring website. 
65. Tas Anjarwalla, Should Peanuts Be Banned from Planes?, CNN 
(June 22, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-
SOURCE 
Average 
Time on Site  
(minutes) 
Average 
Number of 
Pages 
Visited 
Average 
Time per 
Page 
(minutes) 
Overall (100%) 3.17 2.77 1.14  
 Direct (33%) 4.11 3.36 1.22 
 Search Engine (15%) 2.54 2.44 1.04 
 Referred (52%) 2.50 2.49 1.00 
Top 3 sites 
(CNN.com, 
Facebook, 
Frommers.com) 
2.05 1.92 1.07 
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and online (e.g., two Washington Post stories66). 
 
 
We were particularly interested to observe that, contrary 
to conventional communications wisdom, a print version of the 
message apparently can drive an electronic response. The July 
11 article in the Sunday Washington Post Travel Section 
appeared online four days earlier. Users who came to 
Regulation Room from a link in the online version, however, 
 
22/travel/ban.peanuts.planes_1_peanut-allergy-air-carrier-access-act-buffer-
zone?_s=PM:TRAVEL. 
66. Christopher Elliott, Airline Passengers Get a Chance to Be Heard on 
Proposed Regulations, WASH. POST, July 11, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/06/AR2010070603957.html; Christopher Elliott, 
Air Travelers, Let Your Voices Be Heard, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2010, at F2, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/27/AR2010082702605.html. 
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accounted for only 25% as many visits as users who came 
directly to the site from IP addresses in the Washington DC, 
Maryland, and Virginia areas. (People who read the article in 
the Sunday print version, and then typed the Regulation Room 
address into their computer’s browser, would show up as 
“direct” visitors). There is no way to prove conclusively that the 
spike of direct visits from the geographical area primarily 
served by the print edition originated from people who read the 
Sunday edition of the Washington Post, but the inference 
seems reasonable. We observed a similar effect from a second 
Washington Post article, on August 27, when the ratio of direct 
visitors from DC, Maryland, and Virginia to visitors from 
washingtonpost.com was about 3 to 1. Articles near the opening 
of the rule, in newspapers in New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta 
and Seattle, similarly show a pattern of substantial direct 
visits from the relevant geographical areas as compared with 
referrals from the online versions. 
In general, social media were less effective outreach 
vehicles than conventional media in the rule. Overall, only 
about 4.5% of all visits originated from Facebook or Twitter; of 
the subset of visits that came from some other website, 
Facebook accounted for just over 7%. However, within these 
modest overall statistics lies a fairly remarkable demonstration 
of how a focused group of stakeholders—in this case, peanut 
allergy sufferers—can leverage the power of social networking 
to disseminate a call to action.67 
In a short section near the end of the NPRM, DOT 
announced it was considering whether to require airlines to 
make specific accommodations for travelers with severe peanut 
allergies.68 In contrast to the other passenger protection issues, 
DOT proposed no specific rule text on this topic; rather, it 
generally invited reaction to the possibility of peanut 
regulation.69 The result was, at least to us, completely 
 
67. On use of social media to rally for social change, see JENNIFER AAKER 
& ANDY SMITH WITH CARLYE ADLER, THE DRAGONFLY EFFECT: QUICK, 
EFFECTIVE, AND POWERFUL WAYS TO USE SOCIAL MEDIA TO DRIVE SOCIAL 
CHANGE (2010). 
68. Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,332 (June 
8, 2010). 
69. Id. 
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unexpected. In the first week the rule was open, the Peanut 
Allergy post got more than 300% more traffic than any other 
issue post, and 44% of that traffic came from Facebook. By the 
end of the rule, visits to the Peanut Allergy post were more 
than 3.5 times as high as the next most popular issue (tarmac 
delay). More than four times as many different users 
commented on that post as on the next highest issue post; these 
185 users made almost as many comments on peanut allergy 
regulation as users made on all other issues combined (454 of 
931 total comments). These comments were overwhelmingly in 
favor of regulation. A CNN article about the peanut issue three 
weeks into the rulemaking70 certainly helped spread the word 
of DOT’s possible intervention to help severe allergy sufferers. 
More than one-third of total traffic to the peanut allergy post 
came directly from a link in this article. Still, nearly 18% of 
total traffic came from Facebook—a considerably larger 
percentage than Facebook’s 4.5% contribution to overall site 
visits. 
Because we had read the NPRM as making possible 
peanut regulation fairly peripheral to the core issues of the 
rulemaking, we had not identified this stakeholder group in 
our initial outreach plan. We did no targeted promotion to 
them. The peanut allergy constituency thus seems to present a 
textbook example of grassroots viral marketing. Through 
Facebook, several blogs,71 and perhaps e-mail and print 
newsletters, members of this group managed from the outset of 
 
70. Anjarwalla, supra note 65. 
71. See, e.g., Ban Peanuts on Planes?, FOOD ALLERGY CMTY. OF TENN. 
BLOG (June 15, 2010, 8:58 PM), 
http://allergysupport.blogspot.com/2010/06/ban-peanuts-on-planes.html; 
Calling All U.S. Peanut Allergy Families!, FOOD ALLERGY AWARENESS BLOG 
(June 10, 2010), http://foodallergyawareness.com/2010/06/10/calling-all-u-s-
peanut-allergy-families/; Passenger Rights “Peanut Allergies” Draft 
Summary, PEANUTALLERGY.COM (Sept. 5, 2010), 
http://www.peanutallergy.com/news/peanut-allergy-news/airline-passenger-
rights-peanut-allergies-draft-summary-for-dot; Peanut Allergy and Air 
Travel: Make Your Voices Heard!, NUT-FREE MOM BLOG (June 16, 2010, 9:30 
AM), http://nut-freemom.blogspot.com/2010/06/peanut-allergy-and-air-travel-
make-your.html; Peanut Ban on All U.S. Airlines Being Considered, ALLERGY 
FREE SHOP BLOG (June 14, 2010, 6:53 PM), 
http://www.allergyfreeshop.com/blog/peanut-ban-on-all-u-s-airlines-being-
considered/. 
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the rulemaking to mobilize each other to come to the site and 
comment in larger numbers than any other stakeholder group. 
The peanut allergy phenomenon is an important reminder 
that users promoting something person-to-person will be a 
more effective form of social media communication than any 
entity-to-audience promotion. The challenge—especially when a 
stakeholder group is not as focused and vigilant as the peanut 
allergy constituency (many of whom self-identified as parents 
or grandparents of children with peanut allergies)—is finding 
ways initially to alert enough group members to the 
rulemaking that the viral spread of information through social 
networking can begin. In the case of pilots, flight attendants, 
ground crews, and travel agents, our efforts to use organized 
associations to pass the initial word to their members were 
stymied, and the voices of these important stakeholders were 
never a significant part of the discussion on Regulation Room. 
Of the 621 registered users who ultimately responded to the 
interest survey question, only seven self-identified as working 
for a U.S. air carrier and four as working for a travel agent; no 
user said she worked at an airport or for a non-U.S. air carrier. 
Because only slightly more than half of registered users 
answered this question, it is possible that members of these 
groups were disproportionately unwilling to declare their 
affiliation. The Regulation Room team, however, was primed 
during summary building to be alert for any indication from 
the content of the comments that the speaker was other than 
an air traveler. The results of their search were consistent with 
the survey: little in the comments revealed a perspective other 
than that of the airline passenger. 
One other outreach outcome may provide support for the 
importance of finding ways to “seed” person-to-person social 
networking. Among the surprises of the peanut allergy issue 
was the emergence of an intense, sometimes heated, debate 
about the existence and validity of evidence on the incidence, 
severity, and exposure methods of peanut allergies.72 
Moderators prompted participants to support their arguments 
with studies or other material, and the result was a sizeable 
list of citations to articles in medical and other professional 
 
72. See infra Part III. 
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journals.73 When the extension of the comment period gave us 
additional time for outreach, we found e-mail contacts for as 
many of the authors of these studies as possible. We sent an e-
mail to twenty-seven researchers, explaining the rulemaking 
and inviting them to assist DOT by responding to some of the 
questions raised by Regulation Room participants. The e-mail 
contained special user IDs and passwords that would give the 
experts access to a separate Expert Discussion page on the 
site.74 Anyone could read what was being said on the page but, 
as we explained in the e-mail and on the site, only invited 
experts could add comments.75 
A few experts acknowledged receiving our e-mail,76 but no 
one actually added comments. Obviously no firm conclusions 
about outreach to experts can be drawn from this single 
experience. However, we think a reasonable hypothesis is that 
experts—as much if not more than “ordinary” users—will be 
more responsive to information coming peer-to-peer than to 
information that comes from a source outside the expert 
community. 
 
D.   Looking Forward 
 
One of the challenges in communications and marketing 
over the last two decades has been defining the “marketing 
mix,” what we at Regulation Room call the outreach mix. How 
can the blend of print media, e-mail, traditional web media, 
and social media be optimized to deliver the biggest return on 
 
73. These are collected by Regulation Room at Articles and Links for 
Peanut Allergy Commenters, ISSUU.COM, 
http://issuu.com/regulationroom/docs/peanut_articles_and_links_final/1?mode
=a_p (last visited Nov. 26, 2010) and were submitted to DOT as an appendix 
to the Final Summary of Discussion. 
74. Experts‟ Discussion: Peanut Allergies, REG. ROOM, 
http://regulationroom.org/airline-passenger-rights/experts-discussion-peanut-
allergies/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
75. Id. 
76. One expert thanked us for the invitation but said, “Unfortunately I 
have very limited to no national data on allergies specifically to 
peanuts. That is something that is really lacking in our national data sets.” 
Another expressed interest but was unable to meet the submission deadline 
because of travel. We also received a few automated “out of office” responses. 
33
2011] RULEMAKING IN 140 CHARACTERS OR LESS 415 
investment of communications time and money? To complicate 
things, the communications environment can shift rapidly and 
without warning, requiring readjustment of the outreach mix. 
In the texting rule, such a shift came when the Secretary 
announced what the media interpreted as a texting ban two 
months ahead of the rulemaking. Because we had already 
invested in significant site preparation, we went ahead with 
our plans—and discovered principally that neither 
conventional nor social media outreach can revive interest in 
an issue on which the momentum of public interest has already 
played out. In the APR Rule, the news cycle worked in our 
favor, primed by the Secretary’s strong endorsement of public 
participation in Regulation Room. The unexpected elements 
were the emergence of the peanut-allergy contingent, and the 
lack of cooperation by constituent groups on whom we were 
counting on to help disseminate information to their members. 
With hindsight, the same lack of cooperation probably occurred 
in the texting rule, but we did not recognize it as a separate 
element of the general level of disinterest. The peanut allergy 
contingent demonstrated the incredible power of social 
networking as an engagement device. Our unsuccessful efforts 
to use groups to alert and engage air travel industry workers 
demonstrated that this power cannot be tapped unless the 
message first reaches some critical mass of network members. 
We have come full circle to a twenty-first century electronic 
version of simple word-of-mouth. 
In the next, as yet unidentified, rulemaking, we will 
emphasize to our agency partners the importance of a single, 
coordinated announcement in which the Secretary can 
command the attention of traditional media and which we can 
aggressively monitor and supplement by direct outreach to 
reporters. We will continue to plan conventional and social 
media outreach targeted to segments of the stakeholder 
spectrum unlikely to participate in the conventional process. 
Identifying and contacting representative groups and 
organizations will still be a part of this strategy, but we also 
need better strategies for reaching members directly. One of 
these will be experimenting with Facebook paid advertising. 
Advertising gives us access to the screens of individual 
members of identified groups (e.g., all Facebook users who have 
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the word “pilot” in their profile), to convey an invitation to the 
rulemaking targeted to that group. We will determine the cost-
effectiveness of such ads: will people read them and visit the 
site? If so, will they in turn promote participation to others in 
their networks? We will also try to create a posting persona 
that complies with Facebook rules so that messages we post on 
group walls can be seen by individual members without being 
considered spam. On the Regulation Room site itself, we will 
increase the number of opportunities for visitors to share or 
recommend site content within their social networks by 
enabling users to post their Regulation Room participation 
directly on their Facebook walls or Twitter accounts. 
 
III.  Virtual Rulemaking Participation: The Good, the 
Bad, the Ugly, the Unknown 
 
Early Regulation Room experience confirms the potential 
of Web-enabled social networks for alerting individuals and 
groups unlikely to learn of and participate in traditionally-
conducted rulemaking. It also confirms that finding effective 
ways to initiate, and maintain momentum in, social media-
based outreach will take a fair amount of effort. User-to-user 
viral transmission of information can lower the barrier of 
rulemaking unawareness, but users have to be motivated to 
attend to, share, and act on the information. Particularly in the 
time-bounded frame of a sixty-day public comment period, this 
will require far more investment in creative, audience-targeted 
proactive and reactive communication than most agencies have 
been accustomed to make in rulemaking outreach. 
Will such investment be worth it? The answer depends on 
what happens when outreach is successful, and new 
participants enter the commenting process. Experience with 
first generation e-rulemaking has made many rulemakers 
understandably wary of broader public participation: electronic 
comment submission in the form of e-mails has had 
dramatically negative consequences in several high-profile 
rulemakings. E-postcard campaigns by interest groups have 
flooded agencies with hundreds of thousands of duplicate or 
near-duplicate comments that must be individually reviewed 
but contain virtually no information useful to decision-
35
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makers.77 
Whether Rulemaking 2.0 can do better at eliciting 
participation that is worth the effort will depend, we believe, on 
a number of factors. These include the nature of the particular 
rulemaking; the extent to which Rulemaking 2.0 systems help 
users successfully manage the information overload of 
rulemaking materials; the ability of system designers and 
operators to educate users about the rulemaking process and 
induce online behavior that is, in fundamental respects, Web 
2.0 countercultural; and finally, the way in which “value” in the 
context of public rulemaking participation is defined. In this 
section we offer some preliminary thoughts on these topics. 
 
A.   The Good: The Potential for Better Information 
 
“Knowledge is widely dispersed in society, and public officials 
benefit from having access to that dispersed knowledge. 
Executive departments and agencies should offer Americans 
increased opportunities to participate in policymaking 
and to provide their Government with the benefits 
of their collective expertise and information.” 
— Barack Obama, Memorandum on Transparency & Open 
Government78 
 
“Is it realistic to think that ordinary people with jobs to do, 
families to attend to, and lives to lead will be able to provide 
helpful information to an agency engaged in a rulemaking . . . ? 
Do we really think that the regulations will be 
„better‟ for the increased volume of public comments?” 
— Prof. Bill Funk, Progressive Reform Center scholar79 
 
77. Stuart Shulman is the expert on the nature, effect, and motivation of 
these campaigns. See, e.g., Stuart W. Shulman, The Case Against Mass E-
Mails: Perverse Incentives and Low Quality Public Participation in U.S. 
Federal Rulemaking, 1 POL’Y & INTERNET (2009) [hereinafter Shulman, 
Perverse Incentives]; Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Might Still (But 
Probably Won‟t) Change Everything, 1 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 111 
(2004); Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation? Mass E-Mail Campaigns 
and U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking, 3 J. E-GOV’T 41 (2007). 
78. President Obama, supra note 12. 
79. Bill Funk, The Public Needs a Voice in Policy, But Is Involving the 
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In the early 1980s, dissatisfaction with the quality of 
information coming out of the conventional notice-and-
comment process led a few innovative rulemaking agencies 
(including the Department of Transportation) to experiment 
with a new approach to public participation: negotiated 
rulemaking (or “reg neg”).80 The basic idea, created by conflict 
resolution specialist and law professor Philip Harter, was to 
bring all the affected interests together and, with the help of a 
trained facilitator, attempt to reach consensus on the content of 
the rule the agency would propose.81 
Professor Harter had observed that the conventional 
commenting process tends to encourage adversariness and 
extreme position-taking, rather than information-sharing and 
collaborative problem-solving.82 Ideally, the public comment 
period would create a knowledge-advancing exchange during 
which participants react to the agency’s proposal, respond to 
each other’s comments, vet claims and data, and discuss 
alternative approaches. Sophisticated repeat players typically 
wait until the last minute to file lengthy advocacy pieces that 
offer only knowledge favorable to their position.83 Moreover, 
these comments are more likely to contain a laundry list of 
 
Public in Rulemaking a Workable Idea?, CPR BLOG (Apr. 13, 2010), 
http://www.progressivereform.org/CPRBlog.cfm?idBlog=F74D5F86-B44E-
2CBB-ED1507624B63809E. 
80. EPA was the other principal experimenter with negotiated 
rulemaking; not coincidentally, it has also been at the forefront of Web-based 
rulemaking innovation. For an excellent collection of materials on the history 
and process of negotiated rulemaking, see ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (David M. Pritzker & Deborah Dalton 
eds., 1995) [hereinafter ACUS SOURCEBOOK]. 
81. Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 
GEO. L.J. 1 (1982). 
82. Id. 
83. In the APR rulemaking, for example, the sixty-two-page comment of 
the Air Transport Association of America was filed on September 23, the last 
day of the comment period. No regulated industry group filed comments 
before September 15, when Malaysia Airlines commented. The International 
Air Carrier Association filed on September 20. All other airlines and industry 
groups filed on September 23. See Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;dct=FR+PR+N+SR+PS+O;rpp=10;
so=DESC;sb=postedDate;po=0;D=DOT-OST-2010-0140 (last visited Feb. 16, 
2011). 
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objections stated in the strongest possible terms than a 
measured discussion of sensible alternative suggestions. 
Negotiated rulemaking is premised on the belief that, when 
representatives of all stakeholders come together in the same 
room, a trained facilitator can foster interchange that moves 
the parties past the stance of staking out extreme positions and 
leveling all conceivable criticisms, to a recognition of common 
undertaking in which real interests can be uncovered, 
information shared, and consensus developed. From this might 
emerge more effective regulatory solutions that everyone can 
“live with.”84 
In current terminology, negotiated rulemaking tried to 
create an environment more conducive to peer production of 
knowledge. It sought to replace the collection of isolated 
monologues that traditional written comments often represent 
with genuine responsive dialogue among stakeholders 
including the agency. This was a revolutionary approach to 
how stakeholders should be involved in the process, but reg neg 
went even further in reconceptualizing the traditional model of 
rulemaking participation. One of its most radical innovations 
got very little attention or discussion at the time: a phase of 
proactive effort to identify the full range of stakeholders and 
ensure that all interests have adequate representation at the 
table.85 
The conventional notice-and-comment process is 
adversarial not just in the sense that commenters tend to 
position themselves as competing advocates rather than 
collaborative problem-solvers. More deeply, the agency’s stance 
vis-à-vis public participation is essentially passive: its 
responsibility is to give notice through legally sufficient means 
and to accept and review all comments it receives during the 
specified period.86 To be sure, its ultimate legal responsibility is 
to create a rule that serves the public interest (however that 
may be defined in the authorizing statute), and to do so in a 
way that involves a defensible allocation of regulatory burdens 
and benefits across the range of stakeholders. But the 
 
84. See generally Harter, supra note 81. 
85. See generally id. 
86. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
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requirement to accept public comments has never been 
understood as an affirmative, inquisitorial duty to seek out 
members of all affected groups and ensure a broadly 
representative range of participation. 
By contrast, in negotiated rulemaking, the agency’s first 
step must be to determine who the affected individuals and 
entities are likely to be, and to identify who might be “willing 
and qualified” to represent these various stakeholder groups.87 
It may engage a “convenor” to assist with this,88 but regardless 
of whether a convenor is involved, the agency must then 
announce its intention to negotiate a rule on a particular topic. 
It must identify what it believes to be the relevant stakeholder 
groups and seek public input on not only who should represent 
these groups, but also whether other interests should also be at 
the table.89 This objective of this process is to create a 
negotiating committee “with a balanced representation” of all 
interests “significantly affected by the rule.”90 Even after the 
negotiating group is formed, a good facilitator will push the 
agency on proactive outreach if it becomes apparent that a 
significant interest is not present. 
The academic literature has debated negotiated 
rulemaking’s success in solving the problems of the traditional 
notice and comment process,91 and the practice fell on hard 
times during the eight years of the George W. Bush 
administration. Still, the agencies with most reg neg 
experience were generally quite positive about the process.92 
 
87. Id. § 563(b)(2). 
88. Id. § 563. 
89. Id. § 564. 
90. Id. § 563(a). 
91. See Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory 
Negotiation Versus Conventional Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and 
Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. 599 (2000). Compare Bill Funk, When 
Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Reg-Neg and the Public Interest—EPA‟s Woodstove 
Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55 (1987), and Cary Coglianese, Assessing 
Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 
DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (critical of the process), with Neil Eisner, Regulatory 
Negotiation: A Real World Experience, 31 FED. LAW. 371 (1984), and Daniel J. 
Fiorino & Chris Kirtz, Breaking Down Walls: Negotiated Rulemaking at EPA, 
4 TEMPLE J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL. L. 29 (1985) (recounting DOT and EPA’s 
positive experiences). 
92. See, e.g., Eisner, supra note 91; Fiorino & Kirtz, supra note 91. 
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Certain aspects of the negotiating rulemaking experiment 
seem particularly relevant to assessing the potential of 
Rulemaking 2.0 to produce better information. First, 
Rulemaking 2.0 outreach can adopt, and perhaps even extend, 
reg neg’s redefinition of how rulemaking participation ought to 
be constructed. A deliberately-strategized, multi-media 
communication plan, tailored to the particular stakeholder 
populations affected by the particular rulemaking, should be 
able to leverage the viral information-spreading capacity of the 
Web. Outreach can be targeted to stakeholder groups that the 
Federal Register—even in its creative new Web 2.0 version93—
cannot reach. Second, Rulemaking 2.0 systems can be designed 
to encourage commenters to engage more dialogically with 
others’ comments. Some of these design elements are relatively 
simple: threaded commenting allows users to comment not only 
on the agency proposal but also on what others are saying, in 
visible discussion “threads”; so long as users are required to 
register and provide a valid e-mail address, an e-mail can be 
automatically generated that alerts a commenter when 
someone replies to her comment and provides a direct link to 
that reply.94 Other elements that encourage responsive 
commenting are more ambitious: human moderation or 
automated suggestion systems that prompt users to consider 
and reply to particular contributions by other users.95 A final 
 
93. FED. REG., http://www.federalregister.gov/ (last visited Nov. 12, 
2010). 
94. Regulation Room offered threaded commenting in both rules; 
automatic e-mail notification will be added in the next version. On how 
participation is spurred by knowing that others are reading one’s comments, 
see Michael J. Brzozowski, Thomas Sandhol & Tad Hogg, Effects of Feedback 
and Peer Pressure on Contributions to Enterprise Social Media, PROC. ACM 
2009 INT’L CONF. ON SUPPORTING GROUP WORK, available at 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1531684; David R. Millen & John F. 
Patterson, Stimulating Social Engagement in a Community Network, PROC. 
ACM 2002 CONF. ON COMPUTER-SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK, available at 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=587078.587121. 
95. Regulation Room currently uses human moderation. Future versions 
will experiment with the second. We are especially interested in comparing 
the results of prompting users with comments similar, and dissimilar, to 
their own comment. See Pamela Ludford, Dan Cosley, Dan Frankowski & 
Loren Terveen, Think Different: Increasing Online Community Participation 
Using Uniqueness and Group Dissimilarity, PROC. SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. 
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 631 (2004), available at 
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group of elements, including collaborative drafting 
opportunities and efforts at online consensus building, are 
quite speculative in this context but surely worth 
investigating.96 
It is probably unrealistic to expect that the online 
environment can support the degree of stakeholder information 
exchange and collaborative problem-solving that a gifted 
facilitator can sometimes achieve in face-to-face negotiating 
sessions. But, compared to first generation e-rulemaking 
systems—which leave agencies in the passive mode of waiting 
for stakeholders to show up and continue to structure 
commenting as a solitary, unilateral act accomplished by 
typing into a form or attaching a file, and hitting “Submit”—
the methods and technologies available for Rulemaking 2.0 
have far greater potential to engage more stakeholder groups 
in more dialogic participation.97 
Still, the question remains whether the result, in the end, 
will be better information than the conventional process 
produces. (We bracket, for the moment, the question whether 
generation of new information is the only valuable dimension of 
rulemaking participation).98 The two quotations at the outset of 
this subsection make opposing predictions. The Regulation 
Room project is proceeding on the hypothesis that both are 
correct. Federal agencies issue four to eight thousand new rules 
each year.99 These range from the momentous and value-laden 
 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=985772; Dan Cosley, Pamela Ludford & 
Loren Terveen, Studying the Effect of Similarity in Online Task-Focused 
Interactions, PROC. INT’L ACM SIGGROUP CONF. ON SUPPORTING GROUP 
WORK 321 (2003), available at 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=958212&dl=GUIDE. 
96. These are also future areas of investigation for Regulation Room. 
97. A considerable problem is posed by the practice of sophisticated 
(predominantly industry) commenters of waiting until the very end of the 
comment period to submit lengthy comments. See supra note 83-94 for an 
example of this practice in the context of the APR rule. The solution generally 
advocated is a second, reply comment period. In Regulation Room, we have 
not focused effort on trying to engage such commenters in online discussion. 
98. See infra Part II.D.  
99. The smaller number is the more commonly given statistic; the latter 
has been used by the official federal rulemaking portal, Regulations.gov. See, 
e.g., E-Gov, PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES, http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/egov/c-3-1-er.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
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to the interstitial and mind-numbingly technical. As Professor 
Funk predicts, the public in general likely has little useful 
knowledge to add to federal rulemaking in general. This does 
not mean that segments of the public have nothing useful to 
add to specific rulemakings. The President’s prediction is likely 
to be true depending on the type of rulemaking and the target 
population(s) for outreach. 
We consider three circumstances in which a purposefully 
designed and thoughtfully applied Rulemaking 2.0 system 
might produce better information. 
 
1.  Broadening the Range of Expertise 
 
We have long known that the conventional notice-and-
comment process tends to be dominated by large regulated 
entities, trade associations, and professional groups. After all, 
these are the stakeholders with the resources as well as the 
motivation to monitor the agency’s rulemaking agenda. They 
have ongoing informal contacts with the agency prior to the 
issuance of the NPRM and orchestrate the creation of detailed, 
sophisticated comments once they have reviewed the details of 
the agency’s proposal. These participants clearly have (or can 
generate) information that the agency needs to write sound 
regulations. But do they have all the information the agency 
needs? 
In an ideal world, the agency would be a repository of 
expertise about the areas it regulates—expertise that extends 
to the crucial insight of knowing what it does not know. 
Moreover, it would have the time and resources to undertake 
the research, commission the studies, etc. needed to fill its 
knowledge gaps. But agencies regulate under conditions that 
are far from ideal. Statutes create unrealistically short 
deadlines for long lists of rulemaking topics.100 Expertise 
 
100. For example, the estimated 243 rulemakings and sixty-seven 
studies required by the Wall Street Reform Act must be completed over the 
next 6-18 months. Margaret E. Tahyar, Summary & Implementation 
Schedule of the Dodd-Frank Act, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (July 15, 2010, 9:17 AM), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/15/summary-and-
implementation-schedule-of-the-dodd-frank-act/. 
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acquired by experienced regulators is lost when a cohort of 
employees retires.101 Domestic program budget-cutting requires 
agencies continually to do more with less. As a result, 
observers now worry about “information capture” agencies 
relying on regulated entities to for the information they need to 
regulate.102 
It would be utopian to suggest that Rulemaking 2.0 will 
solve problems of information bias. Still, observed Web 
behavior suggests that it could help. Wikipedia103 and 
Slashdot104 are well-known examples of Web-enabled 
“donation” of expertise to the public domain,105 but there are 
others, including the innovative PeerToPatent project that 
enlists the broader community in helping patent examiners 
identify “prior art.”106 It may be that experts prove less willing 
to donate their knowledge to the federal government (who 
might be perceived as able and willing to pay for it), but it is 
seems premature to assume this. After all, fifteen years ago the 
 
101. See, e.g., Carl Fillichio, Getting Ready for the Retirement Tsunami, 
PUB. MANAGER (Mar. 22, 2006), available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0HTO/is_1_35/ai_n24988081/?tag=cont
ent;col1; William Jackson, Social Media Helps NRC Combat Brain Drain, 
FED. COMPUTER WK. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://fcw.com/articles/2010/09/06/nrc-
gov-2.0.aspx. 
102. E.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and 
Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321 (2010). 
103. WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org (last visited Nov. 19, 2010). 
104. SLASHDOT, http://www.slashdot.org (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). 
Slashdot, with the tagline “News for Nerds,” is a technology-related site with 
discussion forums on a variety of science and technology-related discussion 
forums. Id. 
105. The quality of Wikipedia articles continues to be debated and 
studied. The literature is collected on Wikipedia itself. Reliability of 
Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliability_of_Wikipedia 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2010). For one of many scholarly assessments, see 
DENISE ANTHONY, SEAN W. SMITH & TIM WILLIAMSON, THE QUALITY OF OPEN 
SOURCE PRODUCTION: ZEALOTS AND GOOD SAMARITANS IN THE CASE OF 
WIKIPEDIA (2007), available at http://129.170.213.101/reports/TR2007-
606.pdf. 
106. See CTR. FOR PAT. INNOVATIONS, N.Y.L. SCH., PEER TO PATENT FIRST 
ANNIVERSARY REPORT (2008), available at 
http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/P2Panniversaryreport.pdf. See 
generally BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN 
MAKE GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONG, AND CITIZENS MORE 
POWERFUL (2009) (exploring the potential of Web 2.0 to bring dispersed 
expertise into government decisions). 
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concept of an open-source web-based online encyclopedia 
produced by unpaid contributors would have seemed equally 
implausible. To be sure, there will be questions about the 
credentials and motivations of “volunteer” experts—but these 
problems are not unique to Web-enabled participation. If 
agencies are not asking the same questions about expertise and 
information paid for or proffered by regulated entities in the 
conventional process, they certainly should be. 
Although we were disappointed by the lack of response by 
allergy researchers in the APR rule, we certainly do not 
consider it proof that experts cannot be engaged in 
rulemaking.107 Our outreach effort was quickly conceived and 
executed, when an unanticipated direction in the commenting 
coincided with an unpredictable extension of the comment 
period. It involved a single e-mail from a university research 
team: we hoped that a researcher-to-researcher framing might 
distinguish our message from the bulk of unsolicited e-mail, 
but we are under no illusions that it had the same weight as a 
request from the Office of the Secretary of Transportation. 
Perhaps most important, we did not attempt to identify peer-
to-peer networks that might include allergy researchers; as 
discussed above, experts, even more than stakeholder groups in 
general, are likely to be most responsive to engagement 
invitations that come from members of a community of 
practice108 rather than outsiders. 
 
2.  Uncovering Local Knowledge 
 
Balanced expertise is not the only kind of specialized 
information that may be under-produced in current rulemaking 
 
107. Four Regulation Room participants self-identified as physicians. In 
the peanut allergy discussion, they talked about experience with children 
with severe allergies and the effectiveness and practicability of alternative 
solutions like having children travelers wear surgical masks; one also 
provided citations to the literature. 
108. On the organization and functioning of communities of practice, see 
Jennifer Preece, Etiquette, Empathy and Trust in Communities of Practice: 
Stepping-Stones to Social Capital, 10 J. UNIVERSAL COMPUTER SCI. 294 (2004); 
Etienne C. Wenger & William M. Snyder, Communities of Practice: The 
Organizational Frontier, 78 HARV. BUS. REV. 139 (2000). 
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practice. “Local knowledge”—the first-hand experience of those 
who deal directly with the objects and targets of rulemaking—
may not find its way easily into the conventional commenting 
process. Agencies that engaged in negotiated rulemaking 
reported one of the most significant benefits to be discovery of 
practical, “on-the-ground” information that improved 
enforceability, avoided unnecessary regulatory burdens, and 
closed unrecognized loopholes.109 
Local knowledge may not be relevant in all rulemakings 
but surely it can be useful to the agency in some. In the APR 
rule, for example, pilots, flight attendants, gate personnel, and 
ground crews will predictably have a perspective on the impact 
and causes of tarmac delays, overbooking protocols, unbundling 
baggage and other fees, and dealing with peanut allergies that 
neither air travelers nor airline industry analysts can offer the 
agency. The one Regulation Room participant who self-
identified as an airline pilot joined the Tarmac Delay 
discussion to explain how the compensation structure for flight 
crews interacted with delay at the gate versus on the taxiway, 
and also pointed out ways in which limitations on ground delay 
could perversely hurt, rather than help, travelers. This same 
commenter also joined the Peanut Allergy discussion on air 
circulation, explaining how the “the advent of more efficient 
turbofan engines” resulted in less fresh air exchange, and 
greater reliance on non-safety related maintenance of changing 
expensive air filters. Similarly, two of the three Regulation 
room participants who self-identified as working for a travel 
agent or global distribution system discussed the practicability 
of requiring air travel sellers to state the lowest possible 
available fare, and made specific suggestions on how and where 
fare information should be presented. This is a perspective 
unlikely to be supplied by either the airline industry or angry 
consumers. 
It is true, as some observers point out, that such 
stakeholders often have membership organizations, unions, or 
other advocacy groups that participate in the conventional 
notice and comment process.110 However, Regulation Room 
 
109. ACUS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 80, at 3-5, 29-30. 
110. See, e,g., Funk, supra note 79. 
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experience thus far cautions against assuming that these 
groups will have the ability and/or motivation to contribute the 
local knowledge of their members to the discussion. In the APR 
rulemaking, most organizations representing employees in the 
air travel industry made a strategic judgment not to file 
comments. (The Association of Airline Pilots did ultimately file 
a comment addressing one issue: the proposal that the flight 
crew have to “make reasonable attempts to acquire information 
about the reason(s)” for flight delays).111 As a result, they did 
not convey the range of knowledge that pilots, flight 
attendants, gate agents, and ground workers could bring to this 
rulemaking. When they also declined to pass along information 
about individual participation to their members, the 
consequence was to make this knowledge largely unavailable to 
DOT.112 
As we discussed in Part II, the challenge is reaching 
individuals with local knowledge to invite them to engage in 
direct participation. Organizations that have developed in the 
non-virtual world to be the voice of these individuals in 
traditional representative ways may not embrace a new role in 
which they become facilitators of social networking among 
their members, or gateways for information that could 
motivate members not only to act directly but also to rally 
others to direct action. The flip side of Web empowerment of 
the individual is loss of control by the organization—and 
 
111. It opposed this requirement because it would add to pilots’ 
workloads during already stressful situations. Instead, the argument was 
made that flight crews should be able to rely on information received from Air 
Traffic Control without having to affirmatively go out and search for 
information.  
112. One commenter on Regulations.gov self-identified as a pilot of 
thirty years; much like the pilot who commented in Regulation Room, he 
opposed the tarmac delay regulations on grounds that they often hurt 
passengers—even if there is space to deplane passengers, which there often is 
not, another flight crew often has to be brought in, resulting in an even 
longer delay. He reported his experience that when passengers were asked if 
they would rather deplane and have a longer delay/cancellation, or just wait 
it out, no more than a couple of passengers wanted to deplane. A handful of 
other Regulations.gov commenters identified themselves as pilots but their 
comments did not reflect this particular perspective (e.g., they suffered 
peanut or other allergies). See Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 
supra note 83.  
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Rulemaking 2.0 may expose the point at which the interest of 
the group diverges from the interest of its members.113 Some 
organizations will predictably be highly resistant to any effort 
at disintermediation. Unions, for example, believe in collective 
action.114 Encouraging individual participation cannot be 
reconciled with the group’s constitutive understanding of what 
it means to provide members with effective voice. Other kinds 
of organizations may be more able to reframe their 
institutional role to include not only giving their members a 
voice collectively, but also providing information that enables 
members to speak directly as individuals if they choose. An 
important part of outreach will be discovering ways to form 
alliances with representative organizations when possible, so 
that they are motivated to pass on the message to their 
members, and, when such alliances are not possible, finding 
methods to reach their members without them. 
 
3.  Gauging Public Reaction 
 
Finally, the general public—or at least very broad sections 
of it—will sometimes have something important to add to the 
process. Majority rule is not the decision making principle in 
rulemaking, but there are rulemakings in which broad-based 
public reaction is directly relevant to the issues, or in some 
other way useful to the agency. For example, in Summer 2009 
DOT proposed a new tire labeling rule in response to a 
congressional mandate that consumers be provided with 
information on how tire choices can affect vehicle fuel 
 
113. Professor Shulman has compellingly described the institutional 
interests of advocacy groups that motivate them to generate mass e-mail 
campaigns in high-profile rulemakings, even as the group leadership 
recognizes that this is not substantively effective rulemaking participation 
for their members. See generally Shulman, Perverse Incentives, supra note 77. 
Also see Professor Shulman’s remarks in Transcript of Panel Four: 
Participation in Rulemaking, Am. U. Ctr. for the Study of Rulemaking (Mar. 
16, 2005), http://www1.american.edu/rulemaking/panel4_05.pdf. 
114. “In 2008, 46 percent of all workers in the air transportation 
industry were union members or covered by union contracts, compared to 14 
percent of workers throughout the economy.” BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CAREER GUIDE TO INDUSTRIES, 2010-2011 EDITION: AIR 
TRANSPORTATION (2009), http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs016.htm. 
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economy.115 Although this rulemaking raised various highly 
technical issues of metrics and testing protocols, the core 
questions were about how best to provide the newly required 
information, given existing tire labeling requirements and 
consumer tire-purchasing behavior. DOT sought general public 
reaction to various label designs and configurations, as well as 
to different methods of disseminating the rating information. 
In the APR rulemaking, DOT was eager to use Regulation 
Room to obtain more participation from the air traveling 
public. We have no “inside information” on the agency’s 
reasons, but we can imagine several possibilities. Most 
obviously, air traveler experiences are potential sources of local 
knowledge on, for example, whether current procedures 
adequately inform travelers of their rights and options in 
oversale situations. More broadly, knowing the strength of 
public reaction on various aviation consumer issues may help 
DOT prioritize its regulatory interventions. The airline 
industry had been struggling financially and new restrictions 
on overbooking, fee structure, and tarmac delay are likely to be 
strenuously resisted on economic grounds. Faced with potential 
consequences of fare hikes or further service cuts, DOT may 
need to choose its consumer-protection battles. Finally, the 
possibility of restricting the service of peanuts has provoked 
strong, regionally-based congressional opposition. Hearing 
from those advocating regulation (including, in the words of the 
NPRM, “scientific or anecdotal evidence of serious in-flight 
medical events”116) may make it easier to overcome political 
opposition if DOT were to conclude that peanut restriction is 
medically justified. 
Accepting “public reaction” as a kind of “better 
information” worries some rulemaking observers.117 They fear 
 
115. Tire Fuel Efficiency Consumer Information Program, 74 Fed. Reg. 
29,542 (June 22, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 575). This rule was the 
basis of the Regulation Room limited public beta test, which did not occur 
until after the official comment period on the rule had closed. 
116. Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,318, 
32,332 (June 8, 2010) (emphasis added). 
117. E.g., Funk, supra note 79; Stuart Minor Benjamin, Evaluating E-
Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions, 55 DUKE L.J. 
893, 905-08 (2006). 
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it is likely to end in reducing rulemaking to a highly politicized 
plebiscite. And, in the small handful of cases where public 
reaction might be truly relevant, they reject online 
participation as an unreliable and unrepresentative vehicle for 
agencies to get it. These are not trivial concerns, but we believe 
they rest on assumptions that should at least be made explicit 
and examined. 
The unspoken assumption behind the first objection is that 
the conventional comment process usually functions as 
something other than a way for agencies to gauge the reaction 
of the stakeholders. In fact, we know relatively little about 
what the notice-and-comment process typically adds to 
rulemaking. Systematic data gathering has been difficult given 
the volume of rulemaking records and, until very recently, the 
inability to use even basic automated information retrieval 
techniques.118 In a 2005 survey of the existing research, 
political scientist William West identified three areas of 
agreement: (1) organized groups will often submit comments on 
issues that affect them; (2) agencies spend a good deal of time 
and effort evaluating the comments they receive; and (3) 
agencies change proposed rules fairly often in ways that are 
consistent with some of those comments (although, he notes, 
researchers disagree about the significance of those changes).119 
Note that neither these findings, nor the well-documented 
belief of organized groups that participation in the comment 
process is effective,120 tells us precisely what the comments 
contain that agencies are attending and (to some disputed 
degree) responding to. In particular, they do not establish how 
often comments, even by sophisticated commenters, give 
agencies specific new substantive information. Professor West’s 
own study, involving forty-two rules, concluded that the role 
comments played most successfully was providing information 
 
118. For most of the modern rulemaking era, most rulemaking dockets 
are in hard copy. Even once electronic dockets emerged, the common use of 
image-based PDFs has hampered search and other information retrieval 
techniques. Even now, much of the comment material on regulations.gov is 
not readily searchable because of the format in which it is submitted. 
119. William West, Administrative Rulemaking: An Old and Emerging 
Literature, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 655, 661-62 (2005). 
120. See KERWIN, supra note 3, at 180-81. 
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about constituent views.121 A subsequent larger study by 
political scientist Stuart Shapiro concludes that the likelihood 
of the agency changing the proposed rule was significantly 
affected by the extent of commenting activity, but points out 
that his finding that comments make a difference does not 
resolve whether this is so because comments provide new 
information to agencies or because they provide signals to 
political overseers that changes are necessary.122 
As it turned out, the texting rule presented a good example 
of comments functioning primarily to apprise the agency of the 
scope, nature, and intensity of support and opposition within 
affected groups. In announcing the final rule, the Federal 
Motor Carrier’s Safety Administration (FMCSA) described and 
responded to the comments it received; nothing in its five 
Federal Register-page explanation suggests a regulatory 
epiphany.123 Organizations representing large vehicle fleets 
defended the initial proposal to exempt fleet management 
devices from the rule; the association representing independent 
owner operators complained about the unfairness of this 
exemption. The organizations representing large fleets wanted 
the provision on employer liability for employee texting 
weakened; the unions wanted stiffer provisions about 
employers. The association representing insurance companies 
argued that the proposed exception for manually entering a 
phone number or voice mail code was equally distracting and 
should be banned; safety groups argued that the agency had 
not gone far enough in the type of vehicles or the activities 
covered. The union wanted the agency to exempt public transit 
 
121. William West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, 
Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bureaucratic Policy Making: An 
Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66 (2004). 
122. STUART SHAPIRO, WHY DO AGENCIES CHANGE THEIR PROPOSED 
RULES? (2007). It should be noted that the finding that change correlates with 
number of comments does not mean that rulemaking in actuality operates as 
a plebiscite. Thirty-three percent of the 860 rules in his datasets had zero 
comments. Another 40% had 1-10 comments, and 20% had 10-100. Of the 7% 
that had more than 100 comments, only a handful had more than 2,000, 
indicating the kind of grassroots, get-out-the-vote campaign that presents 
plebiscite concerns. Id. 
123. Limiting the Use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 
59,118, 59,125-30 (Sept. 27, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 383, 384, 
390, 391, 392). 
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workers; the association of state legislatures complained that 
three years for passage of implementing laws before loss of 
highway funding was not enough time. No one provided new 
distracted driving data.124 In the end, FMCSA narrowed the 
exemption for fleet management devices to use of those devices 
for other than texting, and it adjusted the scope of covered 
vehicles to reach a small group of drivers the proposed rule had 
discretionarily omitted.125 
Reviewing the comments made on Regulation Room about 
halfway through the texting rule, Professor Funk observed 
with concern that “none of them provide any usable data or 
identify any new concern or perspective.”126 The problem with 
this observation is not its accuracy, but rather the implication 
that something else was going on in commenting by industry 
and other organized groups in the conventional process. These 
groups did flag aspects of the texting proposal as especially 
important, or troubling, to them, and FMCSA did make some 
responsive changes. But none of the support or criticism in the 
comments seems surprising. Rather, in this rulemaking the 
conventional comments appear to serve largely to apprise the 
agency of the nature, depth and focus of stakeholders’ reaction, 
and to confirm that the state of the relevant information is 
pretty much what FMCSA supposed. 
So, the question is whether Rulemaking 2.0 should be held 
to what is, in effect, a higher standard of justification than 
conventional commenting. Here is the argument that it should: 
because of the power of social networking, the Web can amplify 
the impact of public participation that is little more than a bare 
expression of preferences. The sheer volume of sentiment that 
can be generated in online forms of participation is likely to 
compel behavior by rulemakers and their political overseers 
that undermines sound regulatory decision-making. 
We agree that broad-scale Web-based participation is 
vulnerable to plebiscite problems. Indeed, for reasons we 
explore in the next section, we believe it is even more 
vulnerable than the skeptics have recognized, and that 
 
124. Id. at 59,129. 
125. Id. 
126. Funk, supra note 79. 
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agencies should be very wary of mistaking Rulemaking 2.0 for 
low-hanging open government fruit. We also agree that 
politicization of rulemaking is, in general, a bad thing. But 
interest group-generated political interference in regulatory 
decision-making is not a new problem. In the APR rulemaking, 
peanut growers had politicized the peanuts-on-a-plane issue 
back in 1999—long before most people ever heard of the World 
Wide Web. They induced their congressmen to use an 
appropriations rider to ban DOT from even issuing guidance on 
the topic.127 As DOT tries to reengage the issue a decade later, 
peanut growers have not been content just to file comments in 
the rulemaking like everyone else. They again mobilized 
congressional intervention—so quickly that, less than a month 
into the comment period, DOT issued a “clarification” of its 
legal authority in the area.128 If Web-enabled public 
participation does increase politicization of rulemaking, it will 
do so by increasing the number of directions from which 
political pressure on the agency is generated. It is hardly self-
evident that the ultimate outcome of the battle over peanuts-
on-a-plane will be less rational, or public interest-regarding, if 
those favoring regulatory intervention also have political 
champions in the fray. 
The second objection—that even when public reaction is 
relevant, it is not properly gauged through online forms of 
engagement—raises the “digital divide” concern that has 
plagued e-government from the outset. Systematic differences 
in technology access and proficiency by age, gender, race, and 
 
127. See Dep’t of Transp. and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-69, § 346, 113 Stat. 1023 (1999). 
128. Clarification to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,300 
(June 25, 2010) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. 234, 244, 250, 253, 259, 399). 
According to published reports, two Georgia congressmen “contacted top 
ranking officials at the agency” to express opposition. See Halimah Abdullah, 
Proposed Federal DOT Peanut Ban on Airlines Crunched, MACON.COM (June 
24, 2010), http://www.macon.com/2010/06/24/1173503/proposed-federal-dot-
peanut-ban.html. One of them, Congressman Bishop, posted on his website 
the letter he sent to Secretary LaHood, under the caption “Bishop to LaHood: 
This is Nuts.” Sanford D. Bishop, Jr., Bishop to LaHood: This is Nuts, 
SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR. (June 10, 2010, 3:43 
PM), http://bishop.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=475:bishop-to-lahood-this-is-nuts&catid=19:latest-press-
releases&Itemid=62. 
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economic status surely still exist.129 The 2009 Pew Internet and 
American Life Project’s report on “The Internet and Civic 
Engagement” concluded, “Just as in offline politics, the well-off 
and well-educated are especially likely to participate in online 
activities that mirror offline forms of engagement.”130 However, 
patterns of online usage are becoming more complex and, as 
with so much else about the Web, are evolving rapidly. The 
2010 report found that African Americans and Latinos were 
significantly more likely than whites to consider government 
use of social media as helpful and informative.131 More 
generally, Pew has found that use of social media by African 
Americans and Latinos far outpaces that of whites.132 In terms 
of age demographics, younger users still make up a 
disproportionate share of those online, but shifts are occurring 
here as well. A 2010 survey of users on nineteen poplar social 
networking sites found that the dominant group is 35-44 year-
olds; users in the 45-54 age group participate at a rate equal to 
that of 25-34 year olds and considerably higher than younger 
users.133 Although people over fifty-five are still the smallest 
 
129. The focus of current concern is on broadband access—that is, a form 
of Internet access that allows faster data transmission. Users experience the 
difference between broadband and dial-up primarily as the speed with which 
a webpage loads—something that can be especially significant for 
Rulemaking 2.0 sites like Regulation Room that contain both a lot of 
information (e.g., comments) and interactive functionality. 
130. AARON SMITH, KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, SIDNEY VERBA & HENRY 
BRADY, PEW INTERNET, THE INTERNET AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 1 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/The%20Internet%20
and%20Civic%20Engagement.pdf. 
131. AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET, GOVERNMENT ONLINE (2010), 
available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Government_O
nline_2010_with_topline.pdf. 
132. Lauren Coleman, The Power of the Rising Social (Media) Class, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (May 4, 2010, 11:24 AM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-power-of-the-rising-social-media-class-
2010-5. For example, Blacks make up 25% of Twitter users; they represent 
about 12% of the general U.S. population. See Nick Saint, Everything You 
Need to Know About Who‟s Using Twitter, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 30, 2010, 
11:34 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/everything-you-need-to-know-
about-whos-using-twitter-2010-4. 
133. Study: Ages of Social Network Users, PINGDOM (Feb. 16, 2010), 
http://royal.pingdom.com/2010/02/16/study-ages-of-social-network-users/. 
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Facebook user group by a long shot, this group is also the 
fastest growing, increasing from 2.3% to 9.5% of users in 2009 
alone.134 
Whether, and how, changing patterns of Internet access 
and social media use will affect online engagement in 
rulemaking remains to be seen.135 The youth bias of online 
usage may be counterbalanced, in this particular context, by 
the fact that even the most publicly accessible issues of federal 
rulemaking are likely to have little interest for teens and young 
adults. In both the texting and APR rules, what demographic 
information we could obtain about those who commented on 
Regulation Room is consistent with this hypothesis.136 
Certainly, agencies should be aware of selection biases 
 
134. Peter Corbett, Facebook Demographics and Statistics Report 2010—
145% Growth in 1 Year, ISTRATEGYLABS (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.istrategylabs.com/2010/01/facebook-demographics-and-statistics-
report-2010-145-growth-in-1-year/. 
135. The large emerging literature on how the Internet will effect civic 
participation includes Kay Lehman Schlozman, Sidney Verba & Henry E. 
Brady, Weapon of the Strong? Participatory Inequality and the Internet, 8 
PERSPS. POL. 487 (2010) and Helen Z. Margetts, The Internet & Public Policy, 
1 POL’Y & INTERNET 1 (2009). 
136. In the texting rule, thirteen users responded to a survey sent by e-
mail to registered users (143). In the APR rule, at the time this article was 
written fifty-four people had responded to a survey e-mailed to registered 
users (1,362) and posted on the website. 
 
 Texting Rule 
(R=13) 
APR 
(R=54) 
Under 30 0 3.8% 
30-39 16.7% 9.4% 
40-49 8.3% 17% 
50-59 33.3% 26.4% 
60 or older 41.7% 43.4% 
 
  We do not suggest this limited number of responses resolves 
demographics questions, but it is consistent with the other information we 
have. In the APR rule, several commenters on the peanut allergy issue gave 
some indication of their age: at least nineteen people identified themselves as 
parents; the stated ages of their children ranged from two to twenty-three 
years. Three people identified themselves as grandparents. A few people 
specifically stated their own ages (28, 37, and “late twenties”), while others 
gave implicit age information: one was an “experienced pilot”; one had been 
“flying for 59 years”; one had been a flight attendant for “19+ years”; two said 
they were physicians. 
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introduced by online participation.137 But, once again, the real 
question is whether Rulemaking 2.0 should be held to a higher 
standard than conventional processes. Selection bias exists in 
any public participation method. Do we really believe that the 
individuals and groups who show up to participate in public 
regulatory hearings, or in the traditional notice-and-comment 
process, are a reliably representative sample of the population 
by age, gender, race, economic status, or viewpoint? The 
inequities introduced by traditional public participation 
methods are not less problematic than those introduced by 
online participation, they are simply more familiar. 
 
B.   The Bad: The Voting Instinct and Drive-By Participation 
 
“My suggestion is to . . . ask for votes, using for example 5 
choices from strongly agree to strongly disagree . . . .  
I am interested in this regulation but do not want to spend a lot 
of time reading or submitting comments.  
How can I just „voice my opinion‟ in an easy way?  
What you already have is useful but too time consuming for 
me.” 
— E-mail from Regulation Room visitor 
 
Effective commenting requires an investment of attention 
and time. This is not just because rulemaking agencies are 
trying to solve problems that are complex, interrelated, and 
often dependent on scientific, technical, and other forms of 
specialized knowledge. More fundamentally, it is because of the 
nature of the federal rulemaking process. 
 
1.  “Regulatory Rationality” & Information Overload 
 
Judicial review of new regulations at the behest of 
unhappy stakeholders has constructed federal rulemaking as a 
 
137. Agencies can take several measures of public reaction. In the tire 
labeling rulemaking, for example, DOT had conducted focus group trials of 
various label designs and configurations. 
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particular form of reasoned decision-making.138 Rulemakers 
must not only act within, but also correctly perceive, the scope 
of their legislatively delegated discretion. They must identify 
the statutory goals they are trying to further and explain how 
the new rule will further those purposes. They must assemble 
and consider the relevant facts, explain the connection between 
the facts found and the choices made (including distinguishing 
or otherwise explaining away facts that do not fit), respond to 
salient questions and criticisms raised by commenters, and 
discuss why alternative solutions were not chosen. In sum, 
they must conduct themselves according to a legal model of 
how a rational decision-maker approaches the task of solving a 
difficult and important problem. On top of the demands of 
judicial review, Presidential oversight has demanded that 
agencies demonstrate the economic rationality of their 
proposed regulations through cost-benefit analysis.139 And 
finally, both Congress and the President have required 
rulemakers to demonstrate particular kinds of political 
rationality by showing that they have attended to a variety of 
politically favored interests and groups, including the 
environment, privacy, private property, small businesses, state 
and local governments, Native tribes, children’s health and 
safety, and the national energy supply.140 
The resulting amalgam—which we will shorthand as 
agencies’ duty to demonstrate “regulatory rationality” in 
rulemaking—has consequences that are an object lesson in the 
blessing and the curse of transparency. On the one hand, 
stakeholders wanting to participate in rulemaking have access 
to a great deal of information about how the agency assesses 
the situation and what it is trying to accomplish. On the other 
hand, stakeholders wanting to participate effectively in 
rulemaking have to master a great deal of information in order 
to provide the kind of comments to which the agency must 
attend. As rulemakings go, neither the texting rule nor the 
APR rule was technically complicated. Yet, the texting NPRM 
 
138. For more detailed discussion of the legal requirements summarized 
in this paragraph, see LUBBERS, supra note 10, at 376-85. 
139. See REGINFO.GOV, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/ (last visited Nov. 
19, 2010). 
140. LUBBERS, supra note 10, at 241-72. 
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was a thirteen page, 12,800 word document, written at a 
college reading level.141 The regulatory impact analysis and 
preliminary environmental assessment added another thirty-
nine pages and 14,731 words.142 And then there were the seven 
citied studies. In the APR rulemaking, the NPRM was twenty-
two pages and 24,800 words, at a post-graduate reading level, 
with a 107 page, 35,178 word regulatory impact analysis.143 
Rulemaking 2.0 systems have two basic strategies for 
helping users manage the cognitive demands of rulemaking: 
thoughtful design of the site’s information architecture, and 
human assistance.144 Regulation Room is experimenting with 
both strategies. As explained above, the team of students and 
faculty divides the agency proposal into conceptually coherent 
issues manageable for discussion. The complete set of these 
issues can be reviewed and accessed through a “rule 
dashboard.” The issue post on each issue summarizes relevant 
content of the NPRM and “translates” it into (reasonably) plain 
English. Information layering, through hyperlinks and a 
glossary application, allows users wanting more depth to access 
the NPRM, rule text, impact analyses, and other legal and 
scientific material—while providing additional explanation for 
users who require it.145 Human facilitative moderation 
 
141. Limiting the Use of Wireless Communication Devices, 75 Fed. Reg. 
16,391 (Apr. 1, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 383, 384, 390, 391, 392). 
Reading levels here are estimated using the Flesch-Kincaid scale, a widely 
used measure of readability.  
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Drawing on cognitive psychology and learning theory, Arthur Lupia 
describes the basic objectives that must guide the information design of an 
online system aimed at increasing civic deliberative participation: (1) “attract 
the audience’s attention and hold it for a non-trivial amount of time[;]” (2) 
“affect the audience’s memories in particular ways”—specifically, by causing 
information to be processed from short-term to long-term memory; and (3) 
cause the audience “to retain subsequent beliefs—or choose different 
behaviors—than they would have had without deliberation.” Arthur Lupia, 
Can Online Deliberation Improve Politics? Scientific Foundations for Success, 
in ONLINE DELIBERATION: DESIGN, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 59, 59 (Todd 
Daives & Seeda Peña Gangadharan eds., 2009).  
145. Technology will increasingly assist in building such information 
architectures. Applications already exist to enable users to automatically 
access legal sources like statutes, cases, and the Code of Federal Regulation. 
See, e.g., Cornell University Law School, Legal Citation Finder Bookmarklet, 
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supplements this information design. Trained moderator teams 
mentor more effective commenting by pointing users to 
relevant information, prompting them to provide explanations, 
factual details, and data for their statements, and encouraging 
them to consider and engage the points of other commenters.146 
 
2.  Bad Habits 
 
At the end of the day, however, even the best Rulemaking 
2.0 system can go only so far in managing the rulemaking 
information overload for users. Making comments that count in 
the rulemaking process—rather than merely expressing 
supporting or opposing sentiment—requires people to pay 
careful attention to the information on the site and, perhaps, to 
thoughtfully engage what others are saying. Unfortunately, 
 
LEGAL INFO. INST., http://topics.law.cornell.edu/lii/citer (last visited Nov. 18, 
2010). Eventually, research in natural language processing techniques is 
likely to automate, or at least significantly support, summarization and 
plain-English translation. Automatic categorization and sentiment detection 
research is creating systems increasingly adept at collecting and presenting 
all comments on a topic that support, or oppose, the agency proposal.  
146. On the value active moderation can add to online knowledge 
management and creation, see Joaquín Gairín-Sallán, David Rodríguez-
Gómez & Carme Armengol-Asparó, Who Exactly is the Moderator? A 
Consideration of Online Knowledge Management Network Moderation in 
Educational Organisations, 55 COMPUTERS & EDUC. 304 (2010). In some 
online communities, users themselves take on the tasks of orienting new 
members, articulating and enforcing community norms, and pointing users to 
other areas of likely interest. Sometimes, as in Wikipedia and Slashdot, this 
is a formal division of labor, with users being promoted to 
moderating/administering powers; other times it happens informally. See 
Dan Cosley, Dan Frankowski, Sara Kiesler, Loren Terveen & John Riedl, 
How Oversight Improves Member-Maintained Communities, PROC. SIGCHI 
CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 11 (2005), available at 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1054972.1054975 (describing the 
approach of various sites). We are uncertain about the extent to which this 
sort of behavior can be cultivated on a Rulemaking 2.0 site, given the diverse 
content and episodic nature of rulemaking, combined with the short duration 
of the comment period. Clearly it is desirable, not only because it spreads the 
moderation workload but also because it strengthens the sense of online 
community and common enterprise. See id.; Rosta Farzan, Joan M. DiMarco 
& Beth Brownholtz, Spreading the Honey: A System for Maintaining an 
Online Community, PROC. ACM 2009 INT’L CONF. ON SUPPORTING GROUP 
WORK (2009), available at http://www.joandimicco.com/pubs/farzan-group09-
honeybees.pdf. 
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this is not what most visitors to a rulemaking participation 
website will come predisposed to do. 
Americans increasingly report using the Web, rather than 
conventional media, as their source of news,147 but they do not 
invest much time in the process. Pew Research Center’s 2010 
State of the News Media study reports that the average visit to 
an online news site lasts three minutes and four seconds.148 
(We have, for this reason, been encouraged that the more than 
24,000 visits to Regulation Room during the APR rule averaged 
3.17 minutes).149 Of course, some users and some sites show 
much higher attentional investment.150 But Web designers 
have long recognized a basic Web-use pattern: “What [users] 
actually do most of the time (if we’re lucky) is glance at each 
new page, scan some of the text, and click on the first link that 
catches their interest . . . .”151 According to one recent estimate 
by a social media expert, 64% of web pages are never scrolled—
meaning that more often than not people do not even bother to 
check what lies “below the fold” of their monitor screen.152 
These basic habits of Web use do not prepare people for the 
attentional investment required by a rulemaking participation 
site. 
The second problematic predisposition users bring to 
rulemaking is that American popular culture equates public 
participation in government decision making with voting—
 
147. KRISTEN PURCELL, LEE RAINIE, AMY MITCHELL, TOM ROSENSTIEL & 
KENNY OLMSTEAD, PEW INTERNET, UNDERSTANDING THE PARTICIPATORY NEWS 
CONSUMER: HOW INTERNET AND CELL PHONE USERS HAVE TURNED NEWS INTO A 
SOCIAL EXPERIENCE 3 (2010), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Understanding_
the_Participatory_News_Consumer.pdf. 
 148. Project for Excellence in Journalism, The State of the News Media: 
An Annual Report on American Journalism, JOURNALISM.ORG (2010), 
available at http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/online_nielsen.php. 
149. Average time spent on the “Issue Post” pages ranged from 2:47 on 
Customer Service to 4:13 on Peanut Allergies. 
150. See, e.g., HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ (last 
visited Nov. 25, 2010); N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/ (last visited Nov. 
25, 2010). 
151. STEVE KRUG, DON’T MAKE ME THINK: A COMMONSENSE APPROACH TO 
WEB USABILITY 21 (2d ed. 2005). 
152. Dana VanDen Heuvel, Address at American Marketing Association 
Advanced Social Media Workshop (Sept. 21, 2010). 
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either in formal elections, or through the continual stream of 
opinion polls conducted by every major media outlet, many 
interest groups, and several prominent research services. This 
culture supports (or at least tolerates) a very low level of 
informational investment in citizen participation. The level of 
political literacy in the U.S. population is notoriously low.153 
Studies repeatedly show that a majority of citizens cannot 
correctly answer basic civics questions,154 and that a high 
proportion of voters are mistaken about the position of even the 
major presidential candidates on highly publicized issues.155 
Anyone can respond, without any demonstrated information or 
competence, to a telephone survey about health care 
legislation156 or vote in an online poll about whether “Iranian 
Jews should take the incentives and emigrate to Israel,”157 
thereby creating what is solemnly reported as what Americans 
think. As a national political community, we are not 
acculturated to regard knowledge and preparation as the entry 
ticket to participation in government decision-making. 
Finally, this expectation of a universal, noncontingent 
right of participation is reaffirmed, and generalized, in current 
social media culture. Web 2.0 technologies have democratized 
the Internet: now all users, not just those with knowledge or 
 
153. ILYA SOMIN, WHEN IGNORANCE ISN’T BLISS: HOW POLITICAL 
IGNORANCE THREATENS DEMOCRACY 1 (Sept. 22, 2004), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa525.pdf. 
 154. See, e.g., id. at 1 (collecting studies). 
155. E.g., Richard R. Lau, David J. Andersen & David P. Redlawsk, An 
Exploration of Correct Voting in Recent U.S. Presidential Elections, 52 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 395, 406 (2008) (examining data from the 1972 to 2004 presidential 
elections to conclude that, on average, “about one-quarter of all voters voted 
incorrectly” in light of their expressed policy preferences). Additional studies 
are collected in Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: 
Uncertainty, Information Overload, and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. Pa. J. 
CONST. L. 357, 380-83 (2010). 
156. For a list of roughly 220 polls taken on the health care legislation 
by national media and polling organizations, and correlation of their results 
to show majority opposition, see Health Care Plan: Favor/Oppose, 
HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/07/30/healthplan_n_725503.html (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2010). 
157. This is the actual wording of one of the “Top rated” polls on 
Youpolls.com. See Top Rated, YOUPOLLS, 
http://www.youpolls.com/category.asp?view=rated (last visited Dec. 29, 2010). 
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/8
442 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  31:1 
resources, can determine content. In this radically leveled 
environment, anyone with an Internet connection is not only 
enabled, but encouraged, to review books, movies, restaurants, 
electronics, legal and medical care, college professors, and news 
stories, and then have their views presented to the world on an 
equal footing with anyone else’s. More accurately, their views 
are initially presented, for in social media culture (as in 
popular political culture) social value is determined by voting. 
Anyone with an Internet connection can, by rating or ranking, 
determine which photos, videos, opinions, answers, and ideas 
are the best, the most interesting, or the most important. 
Usually, the one with the most votes wins and, because of the 
power of social networking, ordinary people can mobilize 
geometrically increasing numbers of like-minded others to vote 
up, or vote down, content. This is the blessing and the curse of 
Web-enabled crowdsourcing. Depending on the nature and 
structure of the project, it can result in remarkable 
accomplishments like the Linux operating system, Wikipedia, 
and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.158 Alternatively, it can produce 
sobering collective judgments like a White House Open 
Government brainstorming that put resolving questions about 
President Obama’s birth certificate and legalizing marijuana at 
the top of national priority list.159 
 
 
 
158. Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is an Internet marketplace in which 
programmers identify tasks done more efficiently by humans than computers 
(“Human Intelligence Tasks” or HITs)—“such as identifying objects in a photo 
or video . . . [or] transcribing audio recordings”—and pay a small amount per 
item to anyone who comes forward and satisfies the requester’s criteria for 
qualifications and work quality. Amazon Mechanical Turk, AMAZON.COM, 
http://aws.amazon.com/mturk/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2010). 
159. See Open Government Dialogue, NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., 
http://opengov.ideascale.com/a/ideafactory.do?id=4049&mode=top (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2010). Similarly, in the national dialogue on ideas and tools to 
increase the success of Recovery.gov, the two ideas receiving the “Most 
comments” were about products submitted by their creators and voted up 
with numerous brief endorsements. PAUL JOHNSTON, CISCO INTERNET BUS. 
SOLUTIONS GRP., OPEN GOVERNMENT: ASSESSING THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S 
EFFORTS TO MAKE GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY A REALITY (2009), available at 
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/pov/Open_and_Transparent_Gover
nment_Formatted_120209FINAL.pdf. 
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3.  Using, and fighting, Web 2.0 
 
For these reasons, users unfamiliar with rulemaking are 
likely to come to a Rulemaking 2.0 site primed with all the 
wrong instincts and expectations. This presents system 
designers with hard questions about using familiar social 
media technologies and methods. 
Consider, for example, voting devices. There are at least 
two good reasons why so many social media applications 
(including many of the online participation tools agencies now 
have available through General Services Administration-
procured terms of service agreements)160 offer some sort of 
rating, ranking, or thumbs up/down functionality. First, 
information science research confirms that the ability to give 
and get recommendations can be a powerful user-engagement 
device.161 The ability to star or otherwise register an opinion 
satisfies Web 2.0 users’ expectations of being able to interact 
quickly with content on the site; the possibility of being starred 
or otherwise endorsed motivates people to continue to 
contribute content. Second, these voting mechanisms can help 
manage information volume. Regardless of comment quality, 
an aggregation mechanism that allows fifty people to join one 
comment is more efficient than fifty separate comments 
making the same point. And, at least in contexts where users 
can make knowledgeable judgments, rating mechanisms can 
help sort out valuable content from a large and indiscriminate 
mass. 
Ironically, however, the more successful Rulemaking 2.0 
outreach is, the more problematic it becomes for the site to 
offer these features. Rating comments is not like rating movies 
or restaurants. Users who have never participated in the 
conventional process are highly unlikely to be knowledgeable 
 
160. See the list at Terms of Service Agreements, WEB CONTENT 
MANAGERS F., 
https://forum.webcontent.gov/Default.asp?page=TOS_agreements (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2010). Ideascale (brainstorming) and Mixed Ink (collaborative 
drafting) were used in the Open Government Dialogue. See Open Government 
Dialogue, supra note 159. 
161. E.g., Farzan et al., supra note 146; see also Ludford et al., supra 
note 95. 
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about what makes a “good” rulemaking comment. And voting 
devices are useless if they reinforce users’ starting assumption 
that the agency will respond to the position that has the most 
supporters. 
For these reasons, we have been very cautious about 
incorporating rating and endorsement devices into Regulation 
Room. The most recent version tried to capitalize on the 
engagement potential of voting without triggering its negative 
side-effects. In the APR rule, a colorful and conspicuously 
placed poll allowed visitors to select among several passenger 
rights issues in answer to the question “What matters to you?” 
This question, modeled after an engagement strategy group 
facilitators use in non-virtual settings, was carefully framed 
not to suggest that users were voting for any particular 
regulatory response. The poll also served a channeling 
function: after a visitor “voted for” an issue, she was prompted 
with a link to the Issue Post that she apparently would be most 
motivated to read about and discuss.162 
We have no current plans to add voting functionality 
connected with individual comments (beyond enabling users to 
“recommend” or “share” the comment on Facebook, Twitter, 
and other social networking media). Without a more broadly 
shared understanding of what an effective comment looks like, 
we believe that enabling users to rate comments with stars, or 
thumbs up or down, is likely only to reinforce the rulemaking-
as-plebiscite assumption. Creating such an understanding by 
educating users about the rulemaking process is a key objective 
of a Rulemaking 2.0 site. However, based on our experience so 
far, simply providing materials about the process and effective 
commenting is relatively unsuccessful when users assume they 
already know how public participation works.163 In the next 
version, we will allow moderators to star (or otherwise 
recommend) high-quality comments. Our goal is to see whether 
identifying exemplars will, over the course of the comment 
period, induce better understanding of comment “value,” 
 
162. The poll did generate interest: more than 13,000 votes were cast 
(1,189 visitors registered as users; 348 users made comments). We did not 
report them to DOT in the Final Summary of Discussion. 
163. During the APR rule, the Learn About Rulemaking pages on the 
site were viewed 251 times; total page views during the rule exceeded 67,700. 
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especially if facilitative moderation is simultaneously nudging 
all commenters to improve the quality of their comments by 
adding reasons, facts, alternatives, etc. If this “expert” rating 
system succeeds, we may be able to “promote” users who have 
mastered good commenting by giving them moderator-like 
powers. 
We are curious whether a function like “This comment was 
useful to me” could allow all users to recognize (and so 
incentivize) thoughtful participation without encouraging the 
voting instinct. This is an area for future experimentation—as 
is the question whether a carefully structured opportunity to 
“Sign on” to comments can decrease the incidence of multiple, 
substantively overlapping comments without creating the 
appearance of “majority rules,” and the consequent temptation 
to use social networking simply to run up the vote. 
The basic point is that Rulemaking 2.0 systems will have 
to work diligently to tame the voting instinct and to change the 
habits of low-investment participation. Our early experience 
suggests that some progress can be made: the sheer novelty of 
a site like Regulation Room disrupts visitors’ assumptions 
about what to do and how to behave, thereby creating a 
window in which a distinctive culture can arise. One of our 
student team members first noticed that comments posted on 
Regulation Room differ from “typical” blog comments. Almost 
universally, our commenters write in full sentences, use 
punctuation and correct spelling and grammar, and avoid 
abbreviations. And they respond surprisingly often to 
moderator requests that they “improve” their comments.164 
At the same time, our experience is that some people will 
push back, and push back hard. Drive-by participation is all 
that some users want, and they expect to be able to do so 
immediately, with minimal thought or effort. Their reaction to 
a site that does not conform to these expectations can be more 
 
164. In the texting rule there were thirteen instances where moderator 
response was designed to elicit additional information or elaboration; nine 
(69%) resulted in response from users and four (31%) resulted in no response. 
Preliminary data analysis from the APR rule follows a similar trend, with 
moderator receiving a response to questions approximately 70% of the time. 
Sometimes the response comes from the original commenter; other times, 
another commenter responds. 
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vehement than simply making a quick exit. Rulemaking 2.0 
system designers are thus tempted to seek a middle ground: to 
challenge and support as many users as possible to participate 
through informed commenting, but also to provide those who 
insist on “just voting” with ways to do so that do not interfere 
with, or overwhelm, genuine participatory engagement. We 
repeatedly debate this “containment” strategy within the 
design team, simultaneously recognizing its appeal, while 
being skeptical that it will work. The voting instinct may be so 
strong (particularly in the context of public participation in 
government decision-making on a Web 2.0 site) that any 
accommodation will sabotage efforts to create a new 
participatory culture that makes higher demands on online 
community members. 
 
C.   The Ugly: Of Flaming, Trolls, and Snarks 
 
“Methinks you have an agenda. Highly suspicious that the child 
of a physician who is hyper aware of bad things that can 
happen coincidentally has not one, but three life threatening 
allergies. 
Have you heard of Muncha[u]sen by Proxy? 
Do you realize that most kids have mild reactions to various 
food items that they invariably grow out of by the age of 5? 
Food allergies have to be the most overblown imagined health 
problem of our time. Hypochondriacs all.” 165 
— “Howie” responding to “Doctor Mom” in APR peanut allergy 
discussion 
 
“Gullible parents telling their kids not to eat peanuts 
because they are or might be allergic causes needless anxiety 
for those children, and when they finally are exposed to peanuts 
or peanut dust, they end up having an allergy. That‟s 
irresponsible parenting.” 166 
 
165. Howie, Comment to Airline Passenger Rights “Peanut allergies”, 
REG. ROOM (June 18, 2010, 17:08 EST), http://regulationroom.org/airline-
passenger-rights/peanut-allergies/. 
166. Mulder, Comment to Airline Passenger Rights “Peanut allergies”, 
REG. ROOM (June 13, 2010, 14:22 EST), http://regulationroom.org/airline-
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— “Mulder” in APR peanut allergy discussion 
 
Drawing the line between robust debate that advances 
knowledge-creation and speech that harms civic deliberation is 
a familiar dilemma in democracies. It has even greater salience 
for public participation websites because of the “online 
disinhibition effect”: people will say things to one another 
online that they would never say in non-virtual conversation.167 
The phenomenon was first observed and studied in the 
context of e-mail, but Web 2.0 has raised uncivil discourse to 
new levels of prevalence and intensity. “Flaming” is the general 
term for adding online content that is hostile, aggressive, or 
insulting.168 The behavior exists on a spectrum. “Trolls” engage 
in the most extreme form: cruising the Internet to deliberately 
insert inflammatory, offensive, or off-topic content to disrupt or 
divert online discussion. Mainstream Web norms regard 
trolling as misconduct. The status of less extreme forms of 
flaming is more ambiguous. There is a growing movement to 
practice (and, in the case of blog owners, to enforce on others) 
standards of online civil discourse.169 At the same time, there is 
 
passenger-rights/peanut-allergies/. 
167. See Adam N. Joinson, Disinhibition and the Internet, in 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE INTERNET: INTRAPERSONAL, INTERPERSONAL, & 
TRANSPERSONAL IMPLICATIONS 80 (Jayne Gackenbach ed., 2007). Over the 
years various explanatory theories, including deindividualization, lack of 
social cues, and lack of opportunity for reflection, have been proposed, and 
disputed. A useful review can be found in Elaine W. J. Ng & Benjamin H. 
Detenber, The Impact of Synchronicity and Civility in Online Political 
Discussions on Perceptions and Intentions to Participate, 10 J. OF COMPUTER-
MEDIATED COMM., art. 4 (2005), available at 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol10/issue3/ng.html. 
168. See Ann K. Turnage, Email Flaming Behaviors and Organizational 
Conflict, 13 J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., art. 3 (2007), available at 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/turnage.html (reviewing various 
definitions of flaming). 
169. In 2007, leading Web figure Tim O’Reilly proposed a Bloggers’ Code 
of Conduct, and called on bloggers not only to be civil in their posts but also 
to moderate comments for civility. Tim O’Reilly, Call for a Blogger‟s Code of 
Conduct, O’REILLY RADAR (Mar. 31, 2007), 
http://radar.oreilly.com/archives/2007/03/call-for-a-blog-1.html. Examples of 
bloggers who have responded to the call include biologist John S. Wilkins, 
whose initial post on moving to a new blog platform included a phrase that 
has been widely quoted: “this is still my living room, so don’t piss on the 
floor,” John S. Wilkins, Welcome to ET 3!, EVOLVING THOUGHTS (May 23, 
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at least tacit acceptance of flaming as an embedded element of 
online behavior. For example, the Netiquette Guidelines (a sort 
of model code of conduct for online users and administrators) 
advise that “[i]n general, rules of common courtesy for 
interaction with people should be in force” and recommend 
against “heated messages.”170 But another section suggests that 
the real netiquette violation is failing to give fair warning: if a 
user has “really strong feelings about a subject” he ought to 
bracket his message in a “FLAME ON/FLAME OFF” 
enclosure.171 Milder forms of incivility like “snarkiness” are an 
established social media voice: in the 2009 State of the 
Blogosphere survey, conducted by blog monitor Technorati, 
16% of bloggers described themselves as “snarky” and 18% as 
“confrontational.”172 
In Regulation Room, uncivil discourse was not an issue in 
the texting rule but, as illustrated by the quotes from Howie 
and Mulder at the start of this section, the problem emerged in 
the APR rule. Flaming is generally associated with discussion 
of issues that have a heavy non-rational or emotional 
component (e.g., religion, politics, sports) or are otherwise 
socially divisive. We were unprepared for peanuts-on-a-plane to 
be such an issue. Howie and Mulder were two of three 
Regulation Room users (the third was King Slav) who posted 
comments that were sarcastic, derisive, gratuitously nasty, and 
at times insultingly personal. These comments began with a 
salvo by KingSlav two days after the comment period opened173 
 
2009), http://evolvingthoughts.net/2009/05/23/welcome-to-et-3/, and legal 
academic Jack Balkin, explaining his decision to switch the default setting on 
his blog to no comments: “Generally speaking, there are two things you want 
from a comments section: quality of comments, and civility. If you cannot 
have one, at least you want the other. Recently, with some exceptions, it has 
become obvious that neither is occurring in our comments sections here.” 
Jack Balkin, New Comments Policy at Balkinization, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 29, 
2009), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/01/new-comments-policy-at-
balkinization.html. 
170. Sally Hambridge, RFC 1855: Netiquette Guidelines, DEL. TECHNICAL 
& COMMUNITY C. (Oct. 24, 1995), http://www.dtcc.edu/cs/rfc1855.html. 
171. Id. § 2.1.1. 
172. Matt Sussman, Day 2: The What and Why of Blogging—SOTB 
2009, TECHNORATI (Oct. 20, 2009), http://technorati.com/blogging/article/day-
2-the-what-and-why2/. 
173. “Do NOT in any way regulate the service of peanuts on airlines. 
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and ended in mid-July. Mulder and Howie (who were two of the 
three most frequent commenters on the entire site) routinely 
violated a core guideline for online civility: “Comment on 
content, not on the contributor.”174 Still, all of them avoided the 
epithets or threats that would have put them unambiguously 
outside the Regulation Room site use guidelines, and their 
comments—especially those of Mulder—were on-topic and 
often well-reasoned.175 
Such commenters present a tough challenge for 
Rulemaking 2.0. Uncivil discourse can be contagious, leading in 
the worst cases to full-fledged “flame wars.”176 For reasons 
discussed in the previous subsection, a Rulemaking 2.0 site 
must attend to culture-building more consciously and carefully 
than the typical social media site. In Regulation Room, the 
more formal style of user commenting, combined with 
 
This is a ridiculous intrusion on free enterprise and personal freedom. Not to 
mention, it will simply encourage freedom loving travelers to bring large 
amounts of peanuts on the aircraft themselves. Someone should stuff a bag of 
peanuts up the backside of Ray LaHood for proposing this stupid proposal.” 
KingSlav, Comment to Airline Passenger Rights “Peanut allergies”, REG. 
ROOM (June 4, 2010, 1:10 EST), http://regulationroom.org/airline-passenger-
rights/peanut-allergies/. KingSlav was the most verbally aggressive, but did 
not personalize his attacks the way the other two did. 
174. Wikipedia: No Personal Attacks, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:No_personal_attacks (last visited Jan. 
4, 2011). 
175. Mulder was more articulate than Howie, who often took on the role 
of sidekick and cheerleader. See, e.g., Howie, Comment to Airline Passenger 
Rights “Peanut allergies”, REG. ROOM (June 18, 2010, 17:27 EST), 
http://regulationroom.org/airline-passenger-rights/peanut-allergies/ (“My 
hat’s off to you Mr. Mulder (Fox isn’t it?). You seem to be the only voice of 
reason in this entire thread.”) One user (Antanagoge), implied at one point 
that Mulder and Howie were the same person. See infra, note 195 and 
accompanying text. This was certainly possible. Users could not register (and 
so comment) without supplying a working e-mail address, but many Web 
users have multiple e-mail addresses for perfectly legitimate reasons. 
176. See, e.g., R. A. Friedman & S. C. Currall, Conflict Escalation: 
Dispute Exacerbating Elements of E-Mail Communication Conflict, 56 HUM. 
REL. 1325 (2003), available at 
http://www.owen.vanderbilt.edu/vanderbilt/data/research/337full.pdf; see also 
S. Wojcik, The Three Key Roles of Moderator in Municipal Online Forums, 
POL.: WEB 2.0: AN INT’L CONF. (2008), available at 
http://newpolcom.rhul.ac.uk/politics-web-20-paper-download/Wojcik,Web 2.0 
London,April 2008.pdf (study of French municipal forums observing how 
failure to act on caustic, highly emotional comments could result in escalation 
and deter participation). 
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moderator interventions that point users to relevant 
information and otherwise mentor more effective commenting, 
implicitly signals that this is a place for thoughtful engagement 
with serious policy issues, not an opportunity for unfiltered 
venting or roving target practice. How much snarkiness can be 
tolerated before that emerging culture is endangered? At the 
same time, the site is committed to broader public 
participation, supported by proactive, facilitative moderation. 
Precisely because moderation is such an important and visible 
dynamic in the discussion, moderators must not only be, but 
also be perceived by users to be, viewpoint-neutral. Howie, 
Mulder, and KingSlav were firmly planted in the anti-peanut 
regulation camp, which was a small minority of users making 
comments. Invoking our site use guidelines to rein them in 
could easily have been construed as content-based, diverting 
attention from issues in the rulemaking to the neutrality of our 
process.177 
A separate concern raised by uncivil discourse is that once 
site visitors observe the real possibility of being attacked for 
their views, they will be chilled from joining or returning to the 
discussion.178 At the same time, however, online community 
research shows that snarkiness can actually spur participation, 
at least in some settings.179 Moreover, some deliberative 
 
177. See Scott Wright, Government-run Online Discussion Fora: 
Moderation, Censorship and the Shadow of Control, 8 BRIT. J. OF POL. & INT’L 
REL. 550 (2006) (study of two UK political discussion boards revealing, inter 
alia, allegations of bias and censorship that came from moderator removal of 
comments). Prof. Wright suggested this problem might be lessened by 
bifurcating the moderator role into a facilitator and a separate “censor.” Id. at 
563.  
178. The importance of site policies that assure new users they can 
participate safely has been recognized in various online contexts. See, e.g., 
Wojcik, supra note 176 (municipal online discussion forums); I. Beschastnikh, 
T. Kriplean & D.W. McDonald, Wikipedian Self-Governance in Action: 
Motivating the Policy Lens, PROC. OF THE AAAI INT’L CONF. ON WEBLOGS & 
SOCIAL MEDIA (2008), available at 
http://www.cs.washington.edu/homes/travis/papers/icwsm08_final.pdf. On the 
role of moderation here, see Gairín-Sallán et al., supra note 146. 
179. E.g., Moira Burke & Robert Kraut, Mind Your Ps and Qs: The 
Impact of Politeness and Rudeness in Online Communities, PROC. OF THE 
ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK 281-284 (2008), 
available at http://www.thoughtcrumbs.com/publications/328-burke.pdf 
(finding that politeness increased participation in some technical groups, but 
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democracy research argues that online disinhibition can have 
positive effects when physical absence and the absence of social 
cues allows a more open and direct exchange of ideas, 
especially unpopular ones.180 We are still analyzing the 
complex patterns of discussion on the peanut allergy post 
during this period, but so far we have found no evidence that 
other commenters were chilled. Indeed, there is some 
indication that comment was stimulated. A key dynamic was 
the emergence, about a week after Mulder first posted, of a 
powerful pro-regulation commenter, Antanagoge. Antanagoge 
(who was the third most frequent commenter on the site) 
participated intensely in a one week period between June 18th 
and June 22nd. More than half of these comments directly 
responded to Mulder. Articulate, confident, and prepared to 
engage Mulder both substantively and in style,181 Antanagoge 
was both an independent advocate of regulation and a 
“protector” of commenters who had been Mulder’s and Howie’s 
targets. The result was an extended, robust, and well-
supported interchange that thoroughly vented the issues pro 
and con peanut regulation. It was probably the highest quality 
discussion on the site.182 
How far the First Amendment allows government-operated 
Rulemaking 2.0 sites to control the various degrees of flaming 
is a question that Regulation Room, as a private university 
research site, does not have to answer. Still, we expect that for 
even for government agencies, debates about when and how to 
respond to uncivil online discourse will not come down to legal 
 
that rudeness was more effective in some political groups). 
180. E.g., Jennifer Stromer-Galley, Diversity of Political Conversation on 
the Internet: Users‟ Perspectives, 8 J. COMPUTER MEDIATED COMM. No. 3 
(2003), http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol8/issue3/stromergalley.html. 
181. For example, “Mulder’s statement is both mean-spirited and 
inaccurate. There is currently NO safe effective desensitization for peanut 
allergy (or any other food allergy) available.” Antanagoge, Comment to 
Airline Passenger Rights “Peanut allergies”, REG. ROOM (June 18, 2010, 3:29 
EST), http://regulationroom.org/airline-passenger-rights/peanut-allergies/. 
182. Howie and KingSlav—but not Mulder—returned to comment on the 
draft summary. Both made helpful suggestions, although Howie (who 
complimented the moderators for a good overall summary) wanted us to 
insert that many claimed allergy sufferers are hypochondriacs, and he did get 
caught up in vociferously rehashing the merits with a pro-regulation 
summary commenter. 
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prohibitions. Web 2.0 has accustomed users to largely 
unregulated freedom in the tone and content of what they post 
to blogs, social networking sites, and other forms of social 
media. This heightens the already highly developed American 
sense of entitlement to freedom from any sort of censorship, 
particularly in the context of speech about government action. 
Thus even when site administrators have the power to control 
flaming, using it is likely to be costly.183 
The optimal solution is for other users, rather than the site 
administrator, to manage the problem. In the APR rule, 
Antanagoge provided an effective counter to Howie and 
Mulder: she184 was as persistent as they were and as articulate 
as Mulder—and she was willing to respond periodically to both 
with criticisms as sharp as they leveled. Antanagoge not only 
held her own in direct exchanges with Howie and Mulder, but 
also responded substantively when they attached other users. 
She seemed to embody a powerful pro-regulatory group 
response to their provocation; this, perhaps, contained the 
degree of inflammatory reaction and reestablished that it was 
safe to participate. Certainly, other users continued to discuss 
the issues with surprising restraint towards the snarks; despite 
repeated baiting, the discussion never escalated into a flame 
war. Even with additional analysis, we probably cannot be 
certain that no users were deterred from participating by 
Howie and Mulder. But once Antanagoge established herself as 
a redoubtable counterforce, we believe that the cost-benefit 
calculus clearly shifted against intervention by the moderators. 
In some well-established online communities devoted to 
peer knowledge production, users manage uncivil discourse by 
addressing it directly as a violation of community norms.185 
Apart from Antanagoge’s occasional references to “mean-
spirited” comments, no one directly confronted Howie or 
 
183. See Wojcik, supra note 176; Wright, supra note 177. 
184. The moderator team believed that Mulder, Howie and KingSlav 
were men and Antanagoge was a woman, although there is no direct 
confirmation of this in the comments. The feminine pronoun is used here 
largely because repeated use of the “he/she” construction proved distracting 
to readers. 
185. This is well-documented in Wikipedia, see, e.g., Beschastnikh et al., 
supra note 178, and to a lesser degree in Slashdot. 
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Mulder for the tone and style of their comments. This raises 
the question whether a sense of common enterprise, protected 
by standards of civil discourse that users are willing to invoke 
explicitly in response to incipient flaming, can arise during the 
average 60-day comment period. Certainly a Rulemaking 2.0 
site should strive for some cross-rule continuity of users, which 
would greatly aid the formation and transmission of a 
distinctive commenting culture. It is not clear, however, that 
substantively related rulemakings will occur with enough 
frequency, in most regulatory programs, to maintain the 
attention of stakeholders other than sophisticated, repeat 
players who have little incentive to leave the familiar 
environment of the conventional process to invest in creating a 
more broadly participatory commenting community. 
 
D.   The Unknown: Lurkers and Legitimation 
 
“I have been watching this discussion for a couple of days now, 
and want to weigh in on a few issues that have been raised 
by both supporters and opponents of a proposed peanut ban.”186 
— “raiseyourvoice” commenting in APR rule 
 
A basic fact of social media life is that a small percentage 
of users supply a large percentage of content. Sometimes 
referred to as the “participation inequality” power law,187 the 
pattern of intense participation by a small portion of the 
population has been observed across platforms: listservs, 
newsgroups, discussion forums, blogs, wikis, and other 
collaborative work applications. Although the degree of 
inequality can vary dramatically with context,188 the general 
 
186. Raiseyourvoice, Comment to Airline Passenger Rights “Peanut 
allergies”, REG. ROOM (June 15, 2010, 22:59 EST), 
http://regulationroom.org/airline-passenger-rights/peanut-allergies/. 
187. Christopher Allen, Community by the Numbers, Part III: Power 
Laws, LIFE WITH ALACRITY (Mar. 19, 2009), 
http://www.lifewithalacrity.com/2009/03/power-laws.html; see Jakob Nielsen, 
Participation Inequality: Encouraging More Users to Contribute, USEIT.COM 
(Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.useit.com/alertbox/participation_inequality.html. 
188. See Jenny Preece, Blair Nonnecke & Dorine Andrews, The Top Five 
Reasons for Lurking: Improving Community Experiences for Everyone, 20 
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rule of thumb is 90-9-1,189 where the first number is those who 
just read (“lurkers”), the second is those who participate at a 
low level, and the third is active participants. Blogs typically 
have a steeper inequality curve: 95-5-.01,190 while the ratio for 
Wikipedia, with its high participation demands, is 99.8-0.2-
0.003.191 On Regulation Room, the participation statistics for 
the APR rule were:192 
Unique visitors: 19,320 
Visitors who registered as users: 1189 (6.2%) 
Users who submitted comments: 348 (1.8% of unique 
visitors; 29.2% of registered users)  
Users who submitted multiple comments: 163 (0.8% of 
unique visitors; 13.7% of registered users; 46.8% of all users 
who submitted comments). 
A large academic and commercial literature exists on how 
to decrease participation inequality through site design that 
lowers the “overhead” of contributing, moderation tactics, 
increasing member commitment through recognition or 
rewards, etc.193 The intense interest in converting “lurkers” to 
 
COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 201, 202 (2004) [hereinafter Reasons for Lurking] 
(describing health support communities with rates as low as 45.5%, software 
support communities with 82% lurkers). 
189. Allen, supra note 187; Nielsen, supra note 187. 
190. Nielsen, supra note 187. 
191. Id. 
192. Numbers in the texting rule were much smaller: 
Unique Visitors: 1999 
Visitors who registered as users: 54 (2.7% of unique visitors) 
Users who submitted comments: 18 (0.9% of unique visitors; 33% of 
registered users) 
Users who submitted multiple comments: 8 (0.4% of unique visitors; 
14.8% of registered users). 
193. E.g., Cliff Lampe, Rick Wash, Alcides Velasquez & Elif Ozkaya, 
Motivations to Participate in Online Communities, PROC. 28TH INT’L CONF. ON 
HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 1927 (2010), available at 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1753616; Jennifer Preece & Ben 
Shneiderman, The Reader-To-Leader Framework: Motivating Technology-
Mediated Social Participation, AIS TRANSACTIONS ON HUM.-COMPUTER 
INTERACTION 13 (2009), available at http://aisel.aisnet.org/thci/vol1/iss1/5/. 
Still, experts agree that participation inequality cannot be eliminated; the 
percentage of active contributors can be doubled, perhaps even quadrupled, 
but not increased by an order of magnitude. Allen, supra note 187; Nielsen, 
supra note 187. 
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active users reflects more than just a desire to sustain the 
health of online communities by getting more visible 
participation, although this is vital if the amount of new 
content is low.194 The conventional view sees lurkers as 
undesirable in principle: they are selfish free-riders, taking 
value from the efforts of others while contributing nothing 
themselves.195 A slightly less negative view is that lurkers lack 
communicational competence; therefore, the goal should be to 
create an environment in which they would “graduate” to 
active participation.196 A different kind of concern is that 
participation inequality means participation 
nonrepresentativeness, on the assumption that the 1% (or 
.01%) who provide most content differ from the silent 90% (or 
95%) percent in relevant ways.197 
In recent years, however, the picture of lurkers has shifted, 
largely due to the work of Jenny Preece, now dean of the 
University of Maryland College of Information Studies, and 
Blair Nonnecke, on the faculty of Computing and Information 
Science at the University of Guelph, Ontario. Their work, 
based on surveys and interviews with members of MSN 
bulletin board communities among others,198 challenges the 
view of lurkers as shirkers or incompetents who contribute 
 
194. Ludford et al., supra note 95; Reasons for Lurking, supra note 188, 
at 203. 
195. See Blair Nonnecke & Jenny Preece, Why Lurkers Lurk, AMERICAS 
CONF. ON INFO. SYS. (2001), available at http://www.virtual-
community.org/index.php/Why_Lurkers_Lurk [hereinafter Why Lurkers 
Lurk] (reviewing the literature). 
196. See id. 
197. E.g., Nielsen, supra note 187. 
198. Professors Preece and Nonnecke have also done substantial work 
on lurking in e-mail discussion lists (listservs). Their overall conclusions 
about lurking being a complex phenomenon—and often a community 
supportive form of participation—are the same as for the research discussed 
in the text. See Blair Nonnecke & Jenny Preece, Silent Participants: Getting 
to Know Lurkers Better, in FROM USENET TO COWEBS: INTERACTING WITH 
SOCIAL INFORMATION SPACES 110 (C. Lueg & D. Fisher eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
Silent Participants]. However, they found additional reasons for lurking, 
many of which apply to e-mail environment more than to online discussion 
site (e.g., volume of e-mails; concern about privacy and safety; desiring a way 
to leave a group quietly). Id.; see also Why Lurkers Lurk, supra note 195 
(based on interviews of mixed media users: e-mail discussion lists, 
newsgroups, chatrooms and online bulletin boards). 
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nothing to the online community. The responses of MSN users 
revealed five principal reasons for lurking: (1) do not need to 
post—reading was enough; (2) want to learn more about, or get 
a feel for, the group before posting; (3) others had already made 
their points, or otherwise didn’t feel they had anything useful 
to add; (4) could figure out the software or make it work; and 
(5) did not like the group dynamics or otherwise thought the 
community was not a good fit.199 
This work provides a new perspective on the large 
percentage of site visitors who do not add content, and is, in 
some respects, particularly relevant for Rulemaking 2.0 sites. 
There are many reasons why people lurk, and some of them 
affirmatively help, rather than selfishly exploit, the 
community: lurking, in other words, is not necessarily a 
“problem.” Orienting oneself to the culture and expectations of 
the particular online environment before adding content is 
desirable community-serving behavior,200 as is refraining from 
adding repetitive or nongermane comments—especially when 
other users (and site operators) are trying to manage large 
amounts of content.201 Site design and operating protocols 
should be attuned to meeting the needs of such users by, for 
example, making it easy for visitors to understand what kind of 
participation is desired in the community, and helping them 
find where they can add value to the discussion.202 But the 
fundamentally important point of this newer work is that a 
substantial subset of lurkers are making choices that reference 
the online community as well as their own needs. They are, in 
a real sense, participating—a recognition that has led 
Professors Preece and Nonnecke to argue that references to 
“participants” and “lurkers” should be replaced with a more 
descriptive, less judgment-laden vocabulary such as “public 
 
199. Reasons for Lurking, supra note 188, at 208 et seq. 
200. Indeed, such behavior is recommended in the Netiquette 
Guidelines, supra note 170, § 3.1.1. 
201. The information overload of too many comments tends to decrease 
participation levels; lurking, and leaving, increase. See, e.g., Sheizaf Rafaeli, 
Gilad Ravid & Vladimir Soroka, Invisible Participants: How Cultural Capital 
Relates to Lurking Behavior, PROC. 15TH INT’L CONF. ON WORLD WIDE WEB, 
ACM 2006. 
202. Reasons for Lurking, supra note 188, at 215-21. 
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users” and “non-public (or anonymous) users.”203 
On Regulation Room, we have relatively little evidence 
about the large number of individuals who read only (the 
methodological problem, as others have identified, is that 
“lurkers do not leave visible traces”204), but results from a small 
group of survey responses are consistent with this newer 
research.205 Combing responses for both the texting and APR 
rules, twenty-three of sixty-six responders said they had not 
submitted a comment. Three of these had come to the site for 
the first time after the discussion period had closed,206 so only 
twenty really count as lurkers. When asked their reason, six of 
the twenty (33%) chose “other people had already said what I 
thought.” Five others (25%) said they could not figure out how 
to submit their comment.207 The remaining 42% gave a variety 
of reasons: two (10%) said they lacked the knowledge or 
expertise to comment; two (10%) felt their employment status 
precluded participation (one was employed by a federal agency; 
the other was an airline employee); one did not comment 
because of comment quality (“Peanuts! I thought most of it 
hysterical and not responsible”); and one said “too complicated” 
with no indication whether this referred to information about 
the rule, the process, or the site. Obviously, the number of 
 
203. See, e.g., Blair Nonnecke, Dorine Andrews & Jenny Preece, Non-
public and Public Online Community Participation: Needs, Attitudes & 
Behavior, 6 ELECTRONIC COM. RES. 7 (2006). Accord Lampe, Wash, Velasquez, 
& Ozkaya, supra note 193. 
204. Rafaeli, Ravid, & Soroka, supra note 201, at 1. 
205. Regulation Room surveys users about their experience after each 
rule closes. In the texting rule, the survey link was e-mailed to registered 
users; in the APR rule, the link was not only e-mailed to registrants but also 
placed on several locations on the website, including the draft and final 
summaries. 
206. These users apparently took the survey from a link in the draft or 
final summaries; each expressed frustration about learning of the site only 
after the discussion period closed. 
207. For a brief period in July technical problems made it difficult for 
users to comment in the APR rule; for an additional period, visitors using 
certain web browsers had problems. However, some users reported difficulty 
even when the site was functioning properly. We continue to look for design 
approaches that help users adapt to the atypical format of paragraph-
targeted commenting, supra Part I, although we note with bemusement the 
user ingenuity that manages to place comments on the site feedback page 
and in the survey, as well as e-mailing them to us. 
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responses is too small to draw any definitive conclusions, but 
these reasons align with what Professors Preece and Nonnecke 
found. 
With respect to users who watch the discussion for a period 
before joining in, we have some indirect evidence. In the APR 
rule, the difference between 19,320 unique visitors and 24,441 
total visits (26.5%) is a rough indicator of return activity.208 Of 
users who commented in the APR rule, 5% (17/348) submitted 
their first comment at least 24 hours after the site visit in 
which they registered. This does not prove that these users 
were learning about the group before posting, for our 
monitoring software does not enable us to verify the number of 
times any particular user returned to Regulation Room,209 but 
the lurker research would predict some such behavior, and 
several APR comments do include references to reading others’ 
comments. 
Users whose needs are satisfied by just reading constituted 
the other major category of lurkers in the Preece & Nonnecke 
study. These are the lurkers who most closely resemble the 
free-riders of early lurking assessments—although Professors 
Preece and Nonnecke point out that the reasons why people 
feel they do not need to post are complex.210 For Rulemaking 
2.0 sites, however, “just” reading may represent a form of 
engagement that increases social capital, independent of 
whether reading leads to commenting. 
One of the most consistent, and frustrating, contradictions 
of modern American political opinion is that most people want 
(even expect) government to protect the environment, ensure 
safe products and workplaces, provide equal educational 
 
208. These data from Google Analytics do not definitively establish that 
more than a quarter of the individuals who visited the site returned at least 
once, both because “visitors” is not the same as individuals, see supra note 45, 
and because there is no way to determine how many “unique visitors” 
accounted for the more than 5,100 return “visits.” However, the differential is 
a rough measure of return activity. 
209. For the same reason, we cannot tell how many of the 95% of 
commenters who posted within twenty-four hours of registering had been 
reading on the site before the visit on which they registered. 
210. Reasons for Lurking, supra note 188, at 216. Other researchers 
categorize such browsing as “passive participation.” E.g., Rafaeli, Ravid, & 
Soroka, supra note 201, at 2-3. 
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opportunities, protect civil rights and, at least to some extent, 
alleviate poverty while simultaneously insisting that 
government is too large and powerful, that programs run by 
government tend to be wasteful and ineffective, and that 
government regulation of business usually does more harm 
than good.211 Those who know about regulation understand 
that we cannot have it both ways. Most Americans, however, 
are clueless about how environmental protection, or the other 
goals they expect their government to attain, comes about. The 
admittedly small set of Regulation Room survey responses 
suggests that Rulemaking 2.0 could change this. To the 
question whether they gained a greater understanding of the 
rulemaking process from visiting Regulation Room, 50% of the 
sixty-six respondents answered yes (about 20% said they 
already knew about the process; 30% said no). To the question 
whether they gained a better understanding of others’ 
positions, 83% said yes (7.5% were unsure; 9.5% said no). 
Finally, to the question whether they gained a greater 
understanding of what DOT is doing (asked only in the APR 
survey), 78% said yes (9% were unsure; 13% said no). 
Respondents who commented were more likely to report a gain 
in knowledge about the rulemaking process and (in the APR 
rule) about what the agency was doing than those who only 
read, but level of learning among lurkers was still substantial 
(43% reported better understanding of the process; 56% 
reported better understanding of the agency’s action).212 With 
respect to learning about others’ positions, there was no 
difference between commenters and lurkers. Thus, early 
Regulation Room experience gives cause for optimism that 
Rulemaking 2.0 participants can gain new knowledge from 
their experience, and, furthermore, that some of these gains 
can result from “just” reading. 
Will a greater level of understanding—of the rulemaking 
process, of the particular rulemaking proposal, and of the 
arguments of other stakeholders—create greater public 
 
211. The existence of, and evidence for, these conflicting opinions dating 
back to at least the 1980s and the Reagan Administration is discussed in 
Farina, supra note 155, at 370-71, 378-83. 
212. Lurkers were much more likely than commenters to be “unsure” 
whether they better understood what the agency was doing. 
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approval, or at least acceptance, of the enterprise of regulation? 
We do not know the answer to that question, but we are 
especially curious about how Rulemaking 2.0 experiences 
might mesh with findings of psychologist Tom Tyler that 
people who have a meaningful opportunity to “make their case” 
to the responsible government decision-maker, and feel they 
have been heard with respect, are more likely to regard the 
ultimate decision as legitimate even when the outcome is not 
what they sought.213 Will online rulemaking participation 
create any of the civic value that Professor Tyler discovered in 
face-to-face encounters with the responsible decision-maker? Is 
it necessary for the individual to actually submit a comment to 
feel that they have participated, or is an experience of 
participation created in those who choose not to add content for 
community-supportive reasons, or because they feel that 
reading is enough to satisfy their needs?214 
These questions about the value of broader public 
participation in Web-enabled rulemaking to members of the 
public themselves seem to us some of the most important (and 
difficult) areas for future investigation. If engagement in a 
Rulemaking 2.0 site increases social capital by positively 
affecting how individuals understand regulatory government, 
then we can answer the question “Is it worth the effort?” in a 
way that that has nothing to do with better informational 
inputs to the rulemaking process—and everything to do with 
better societal outputs. 
 
 
 
 
 
213. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006). Compare reports of 
an increased sense of legitimacy and higher voluntary compliance among 
participants in negotiated rulemaking. E.g., Langbein & Kerwin, supra note 
91, at 602-05, 625-27. 
214. In general, Professors Preece & Nonnecke have found that lurkers 
feel like they are community members and are perceived by other 
participants as members, see Blaire Nonneck & Jennifer Preece, Shedding 
Light on Lurkers in Online Communities, although the MSN user study found 
that lurkers’ sense of community and satisfaction with their experience was 
lower than that of posters. Reasons for Lurking, supra note 188, at 207. 
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IV. Conclusion: Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less 
 
“Q: Please tell us about any specific problems you had 
using [Regulation Room]. 
A: unable to navigate on my mobile device.” 
— Response to APR user survey 
 
“Social networks are effective at increasing participation— 
by lessening the level of motivation that participation 
requires.”215 
— Malcolm Gladwell 
 
In the momentum towards Web-enabled open government, 
it is easy to forget that law and Web 2.0 are very strange 
bedfellows. Law is authoritarian, hierarchical, and bounded; 
the Web is fluid, infinitely possibilistic, even anarchic. The 
boundaries between yours and mine blur as content is created, 
shared, claimed, and recreated. Identity as a social construct is 
realized in the extreme: on the Internet, nobody knows you are 
a dog. Multiple personalities are not psychopathology, but 
merely avatars. Law prizes stability, predictability, and 
rationality; Web 2.0 is constituted of contradiction. Radical 
leveling coexists with relentless ranking. The self-effacing 
collectivism of wikis and other collaborative work platforms is 
enabled equally with the self-absorbed individualism of My 
Amazon, My Google, and other species of “mass customization.” 
Encouragement to practice the reflective tolerance of mutual 
engagement and collaboration coincides with enticement to 
expect immediate gratification and demand absolute 
satisfaction. Law is the structured order of Henry James’ 
Boston or Edith Wharton’s New York; Web 2.0 is the chaotic 
autarky of the Wild West. 
The implications of this incongruity for the whole idea of 
Government 2.0 have, perhaps, not received enough attention. 
But they cannot be avoided in designing a Rulemaking 2.0 
 
215. Malcom Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be 
Tweeted, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/04/101004fa_fact_gladwell. 
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system. Rulemaking is simultaneously the most transparent 
and participatory and the most esoteric and circumscribed of 
government policymaking processes. There are many rules for 
this game—and they are all set by external authority. They 
define what sort of questions agencies can pose, what kind of 
participation matters, and which community-generated 
knowledge counts. They—not the community of users—
determine the purpose of a Rulemaking 2.0 site. 
We, as system designers and moderators, mediate between 
these externally fixed rules and those who come to the site. Our 
expertise is finding ways to make it as easy as possible for 
users to do, not what they want, but what the rules require. We 
exploit the tools and practices of Web 2.0 while trying to 
remake its culture. Small wonder that users are often confused 
and sometimes angry. A Rulemaking 2.0 site gives them what 
they need, rather than what they want. 
Studies of the adoption of new technologies reaffirm the 
common sense notion that dispersion of novel ideas takes 
time.216 With Rulemaking 2.0, the novelty for most citizens is 
not only using social media to learn about and discuss complex 
policy questions but also, more deeply, participating personally 
in the creation of new federal regulations. In their essay on the 
economics of new technology adoption, Professors Hall & Kahn 
point out that diffusion of innovation is the aggregate result of 
individual decisions weighing the benefits of adopting the new 
technology against the costs of change, in conditions of 
uncertainty and limited information.217 Viewed from this 
perspective, the task of Rulemaking 2.0 advocates and 
providers is helping those who have a stake in regulation (but 
 
216. See Viswanath Venkatesh, Michael G. Morris, Gorden B. Davis & 
Fred D. Davis, User Acceptance of Information Technology: Toward a Unified 
View, 27 MIS QUARTERLY 425 (2003) (reviewing and synthesizing the 
literature). 
217. Bronwyn H. Hall & Beethika Khan, Adoption of New Technology, in 
NEW ECON. HANDBOOK (D. Jones ed, 2003); see also Ann Zimmerman & 
Thomas A. Finholt, Growing an Infrastructure: The Role of Gateway 
Organizations in Cultivating New Communities of Users, PROC. 2007 INT’L 
ACM CONF. ON SUPPORTING GROUP WORK, available at 
http://misc.si.umich.edu/media/papers/Zimmerman_Finholt_GROUP_2007_0
8_09_30.pdf (emphasizing additionally the importance of “awareness 
knowledge”—that is, information that an innovation exists). 
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do not know it) understand why they should make the 
considerable investment in time and effort that meaningful 
participation requires. Based on early Regulation Room 
experience, we believe that this is a far more challenging 
undertaking than e-rulemaking proponents have imagined. At 
the same time, the experience also gives us reason to believe 
that Rulemaking 2.0 can indeed be the vehicle through which 
some portion of the public—certainly not all, probably not 
most, but some portion—chooses to move from a state of civic 
ignorance and uninvolvement to a state of understanding and 
perhaps even empowerment. But this is not the stuff of quick, 
dramatic e-government gains that can be trumpeted by 
agencies, or their overseers. For this reason, answering the 
question “Is Rulemaking 2.0 is worth it?” may be most 
important for testing the depth and durability of the 
commitment to a more open, participatory government. 
 
“I think I understood the general idea behind most of the 
proposed rule changes, but the legal/technical language was 
dense (as usual). Other commenters‟ participation helped me 
understand better, and also helped clarify some of my own 
thoughts, leading (in some cases) to a modification of my initial 
opinion.” 
— Response to APR rule user survey 
 
“I didn‟t really have time to read through everything, but I will 
say that I wish more people had posted. I think what you have 
is excellent and glad you put that up there for all of us to 
discuss. I will go back though the site to better understand the 
rule making process.” 
— Response to APR rule user survey 
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